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Abstract 
The mathematical formulation of a large-scale equilibrium natural gas simulation model is 
presented. Although large-scale natural gas models have been developed and used for energy 
security and policy analysis quite extensively (e.g., Holz (2007), Egging et al. (2008), Holz et al. 
(2009) and Lise et al. (2008)), this model differs from earlier ones in its detailed representation of 
the structure and operations of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) gas sector. In particular, the model 
represents: (i) market power of transit countries, (ii) transmission pipelines in Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Central Asia, (iii) differentiation among gas production regions in Russia, and (iv) gas 
trade relations between FSU countries (e.g., Gazprom’s re-exporting of Central Asian gas).  
 To demonstrate the model, a social benefit-cost analysis of the Nord Stream gas pipeline 
project from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea is provided. It is found that Nord Stream project 
is profitable for its investors and the project also improves social welfare in all market power 
scenarios. Also, if transit countries (Ukraine and Belarus) exert substantial market power then the 
economic value of Nord Stream to its investors and to society improves substantially. We also 
found that the value of Nord Stream investment is rather sensitive to the degree of downstream 
competition in European markets and that lack of downstream competition might result in the 
negative value of the Nord Stream system to Gazprom.  
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1. Introduction 
Competition, decarbonisation and security of supply are the main principles of European 
energy policy (EC, 2006; EC, 2008a). Thus, the importance of natural gas in the EU is expected to 
increase since natural gas, as an energy carrier, has relatively low carbon content compared to 
other fossil fuels (such as coal or oil).4  
In 2009, natural gas consumption in the EU totalled 503 billion cubic metres (bcm) (or about 
a quarter of total primary energy consumption) (IEA, 2010). By 2030, consumption was projected 
to grow at an average annual growth rate of +0.6% (EC, 2008b) or +0.7% (IEA, 2009).5 
Meanwhile, by 2030 EU indigenous gas production is anticipated to decline substantially (EC, 
2008b), and thus consumption has to be increasingly met with external sources. 
In 2009 major suppliers to the region - Norway, Russia and Algeria - together exported 
around 51% of all gas consumed in the EU. Russian gas exports alone cover around one quarter of 
the EU’s natural gas consumption, or 6.5% of the bloc’s primary energy supply (Noёl, 2008; Noёl, 
2009). Over 90% of Russian gas exports are transported through Ukraine and Belarus before 
entering European markets.6 Russia’s “difficult” relations with key transit countries on its Western 
border - Belarus and Ukraine - have resulted in several major gas transit disruptions. These 
include transit disruptions through Belarus for 3 days in June 2010 and through Ukraine for 4 
days in January 2006 along with, most severely, two weeks in January 2009, affecting millions of 
customers in South-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans (Pirani et al., 2009; Kovacevic, 2009; 
Silve and Noёl, 2010). 
Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Gazprom has pursued a strategy of diversifying its 
export options to Europe, beginning with the construction of the Yamal-Europe pipeline in the 
1990s (Victor and Victor, 2006). It has continued more recently with the Nord Stream and South 
Stream projects – under the Baltic and the Black Sea, respectively. Once operational, these two 
projects would have a total capacity larger than the current volume of gas being transported 
through Ukraine to Europe. Therefore, as argued by Gazprom and its large West-European clients, 
these projects should increase the security of gas supplies to Europe (Gazprom, 2010c; E.ON, 
2010; BASF, 2010b; GDF SUEZ, 2010; Gasunie, 2010; Gazprom, 2010e; ENI, 2007; EDF, 2010). 
Indeed, the importance of these two projects to the security of supply to Europe cannot be 
overestimated. If materialized, their total export capacities would constitute 23% of the EU’s 
                                                        
4 Natural gas is in a favourable position in the European electricity generation industry, especially in the context of 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions. Gas-fired power plants emit roughly half the CO2 per KWh of electricity output 
compared to coal-fired power plants. 
5 Although, on average, annual growth in gas consumption in Europe during the past twenty years exceeded the 
annual growth of energy consumption, experts are skeptical that this demand growth will continue in the future (see 
e.g., (Noёl, 2009)). 
6 Own calculations based on (ENTSOG, 2010; Naftogaz of Ukraine, 2010; Gazprom, 2010a; Yafimava, 2009). 
 
 
Page 3 of 107 
annual consumption, or 39% of the EU’s total gas imports. Despite their importance to supply 
security, rigorous analyses of the economics of these projects are very limited.   
Therefore, the research objective is to develop a gas simulation model which can be used to 
analyze the economics of security of supply pipelines, particularly the Nord Stream and South 
Stream pipelines. While large-scale gas simulation models have been formulated and used 
extensively in the analysis of the security of gas supplies to Europe, e.g., Holz (2007), Egging et al. 
(2008), Holz et al. (2009) and Lise et al. (2008), the model presented in this paper differs from 
earlier models in its detailed representation of the Former Soviet Union gas sector. The transit 
activities of Ukraine and Belarus are explicitly modelled, while their transit/transmission 
pipelines are represented in detail. Russian gas production is distinguished by its dominant 
producer - Gazprom - and independent gas companies (oil producers and small gas companies in 
Russia), as well as by its production regions (both current and future regions, such as the Yamal 
Peninsula and the Shtokman field). The Russian transmission system and export pipelines from 
Central Asia to Russia are also presented in the model with a sufficient level of detail. Central 
Asian gas production and sales to Gazprom that are further re-exported to Europe/CIS are also 
explicitly modelled. Gazprom’s exports to Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, as well their indigenous 
gas production, are also explicitly represented in the model. This level of detail in the 
representation of the Former Soviet Union7 (FSU) gas “region” in a computational economic model 
is unique and represents one of the major contributions of this work.  
The aim of this paper is to detail the mathematical formulation of the model and the 
assumptions and data used, as well as demonstrating the model’s capabilities. For this purpose, an 
analysis of the following questions will be presented:  
 How do perfect and imperfect competition models differ in their evaluation of the Nord 
Stream pipeline project (and why)? 
 Assuming that transit countries exert substantial market power against Gazprom, would 
consumers and Gazprom be better off if Nord Stream is built? 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The existing literature is reviewed in the next 
section. The model is presented in Section 3 and its validation is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 
presents the results and analysis. The paper concludes with a discussion of future developments 
of the model. 
 
                                                        
7 In this research, by FSU countries the following are meant: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Although Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia were also members of the USSR, 
they are referred to as countries of Western Europe in this research. 
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2. Literature Review 
In the following, the existing literature on natural gas modelling is reviewed and there is a 
discussion of where this model fits into the existing literature. First, there is a review of the 
complex, large-scale gas computational models that have been applied to the analysis of gas 
supply security to Europe. Then, there is an outline of research that has used theoretical 
(economic) models to analyze natural gas developments in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
countries. Lastly, there is a brief overview of applied game-theoretic literature that focuses on 
strategic interactions between Russia and its gas transit countries. 
Using a strategic European gas simulation model, GASMOD (Holz et al., 2008), Holz (2007) 
analyzed the role of Russian gas in European markets and the effects on prices and consumption 
of Russia withholding exports. GASMOD is a two-stage successive oligopolies gas market model 
(Holz et al., 2008). GASMOD explicitly considers imperfect competition in upstream production 
(first stage) and downstream gas trading (second stage) in European markets. In both stages, 
market participants can exert market power by playing a Cournot game. The relationships 
between traders and upstream producers are modelled { la Stackelberg, i.e., traders are price-
takers with respect to producers’ border prices. The geographical coverage of the model is wide – 
on the demand side it includes all European markets, and on the supply side it includes major 
exporters to Europe. The underlying market structure implemented in GASMOD (successive 
oligopolies) is similar to the structure of the static GASTALE model developed by Boots et al. 
(2004).  
A more detailed strategic European gas simulation model was developed by Egging et al. 
(2008). The model contains a detailed presentation of market players (such as producers and 
traders, LNG liquefiers and regasifiers, storage and transmission operators, etc.) on the supply 
side, whereas the demand side is represented by 52 consuming countries, three seasons (low 
demand, high demand and peak) and three consumption sectors (residential, industrial and 
power generation). The market structure that their model implements is different from that of 
GASMOD and the static GASTALE model (Boots et al., 2004). Egging et al. (2008) assumed that 
only traders, as international market players, can exert market power vis-a-vis consumers by 
playing the Cournot game against other traders. According to Egging et al. (2008), one of their 
contributions is the application of their model to the analysis of the security of gas supplies to 
Europe.8  
Lise and Hobbs (2008) extend the static version of the GASTALE (Boots et al., 2004; Egging 
and Gabriel, 2006) model to include the dynamics of investment in infrastructure capacities (such 
                                                        
8 For example, one of their analyzed scenarios involves the curtailment of gas supplies to Europe through Ukraine, 
with another case involving the disruption of gas flows from Algeria to Europe. 
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as storage, pipelines and LNG infrastructure). Similarly to the model developed by Egging et al. 
(2008), the dynamic GASTALE model contains a detailed representation of both the supply and 
demand sides. The market structure of the dynamic GASTALE model is similar to the market 
structure assumed in (Egging et al., 2008). Lise and Hobbs (2008) assumed that only producers 
have market power. The primary purpose of extending the GASTALE model to include dynamic 
investment is to address the policy question of energy corridors to Europe. The dynamic GASTALE 
model was particularly used to study the security of gas supplies to Europe.9  
Lastly, there is the TIGER model developed at EWI Cologne (Lochner and Dieckhöner, 2010). 
The TIGER model is a linear optimization model with a very detailed representation of the 
physical gas infrastructure of Europe. The model results are based on the infrastructure and cost 
fundamentals of the natural gas market and, therefore, the strategic considerations of market 
players are not taken into account (Lochner and Lindenberger, 2009). The model is extensively 
applied to an analysis of the impact of major gas import infrastructure and gas flow interruption 
scenarios on the operation of the European natural gas network (see, e.g., (Bettzuege et al., 2010; 
Lochner and Lindenberger, 2009; Lochner and Bothe, 2007)). While all previous large-scale 
models explicitly represent the market power of different players in the European gas market, the 
TIGER model assumes perfect competition, which makes it less appropriate for studying strategic 
interactions between market participants in the European gas market. 
The research focus of the above gas models was primarily on: (i) market power of 
downstream suppliers in European markets, and (ii) how these markets would react to a possible 
disruption of gas supplies from major exporters (such as Russia, Algeria and Caspian producers). 
Thus, the detailed presentation of upstream activities outside EU borders, particularly the gas 
sectors of Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Central Asia (e.g., a detailed presentation of pipeline 
networks, producing regions, the market power of transit countries and commercial gas relations 
between these countries) was not necessary in previous gas models. Therefore, the contribution 
of this work to the natural gas modelling literature is to include detailed modelling of the FSU gas 
sector in a large-scale strategic gas market simulation model. 
A detailed presentation of the FSU gas sector in a large-scale gas simulation model is 
necessary for the analysis of the economics of the Nord Stream and South Stream pipeline 
projects. These two projects are perceived to enhance the security of gas supply to Europe and are 
important for European gas consumption since their combined export capacities would constitute 
23% of the EU’s annual consumption (or 39% of the EU’s total gas imports). Moreover, a detailed 
construction of the FSU gas sector in European gas market model is also needed to understand 
                                                        
9 Lise et al. (2008) studied the effects of gas flow interruptions from Algeria and Russia to Europe and from Azerbaijan 
and Iran/Iraq to Turkey. 
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Russia’s ability to exert market power in Europe. As Smeers (2008) noted, gas producers compete 
against one another through the transmission system. Thus, Russia’s ability to exert market power 
in Europe depends, among other factors, on its relations with transit countries (Ukraine and 
Belarus) and whether these transit countries exercise market power on transit of Russian gas to 
Europe. The market power of producers and transit countries is currently the driving force behind 
most discussions of the security of gas supplies to Europe (Smeers, 2008). As Smeers (2008, p. 41) 
argues:  
 
It is certain though that very few would mention security of gas supply if resources were 
owned by one thousands producers and not reside in a few hands. One would not interpret 
Russia trying to get market prices (possibly excessive, but in any case non discriminatory) 
from Ukraine or Belarus as a political move if Russia were just one small producer among 
many. It would just be a normal market operation: Ukraine and Belarus have had to pay 
Western market price or be cut off. This trivial observation makes it clear that the market 
power of the producers is the driving theme of most of the discussion of security of supply. 
 
Thus, upstream gas activities in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries and the market power of 
transit countries (particularly Ukraine and Belarus) deserve much greater attention in any 
analysis of the security of gas supplies to Europe (Smeers, 2008).  
The analysis of the natural gas sector of FSU countries using economic models (mostly using 
a non-cooperative game theoretic framework) has gained considerable interest from researchers 
since the mid-1990s. During the 1990s and early 2000s, a push for market reforms and 
liberalization of national economies in the FSU countries spurred interest in researching gas 
relations between these countries in different contexts: (i) Russian gas exports to Europe and the 
country’s relations with transit countries (Grais and Zheng, 1996), (ii) gas pricing policies in 
Russia (Tarr and Thomson, 2004) and (iii) Russia’s gas transportation options to Europe and its 
relations with transit countries (Chollet et al., 2000; Hirschhausen et al., 2005). Since the mid-
2000s, Russia’s gas relations with its key transit countries (Belarus and Ukraine) have 
deteriorated, resulting in several gas transit disruptions to Europe; thus the economic modelling 
of FSU gas relations has again gained interest among researchers but primarily in the context of 
the security of gas supplies to Europe (Bolle and Ruban, 2007; Morbee and Proost, 2008; Sagen 
and Tsygankova, 2008).  
Lastly, another interesting stream of literature on modelling gas relations between FSU 
countries using applied game-theoretic models (such as cooperative bargaining models) is 
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represented by (Newbery, 1994; Hubert and Ikonnikova, 2003; Hubert and Ikonnikova, 2004; 
Hubert and Suleymanova, 2008; Hubert and Ikonnikova, 2009). More specifically, this research is 
concerned with questions of strategic investment in large-scale gas pipelines in the context of 
bilateral (Newbery, 1994) and multilateral bargaining (Hubert and Ikonnikova, 2003; Hubert and 
Ikonnikova, 2004; Hubert and Suleymanova, 2008; Hubert and Ikonnikova, 2009) between Russia 
and its largest transit countries (such as Ukraine and Belarus). 
In contrast to the large-scale gas market simulation models discussed above, the latter two 
research streams (cooperative and non-cooperative game theoretic models) lack any detailed 
representation of the downstream side of the European gas markets or the strategic interactions 
between gas exporters to Europe, and have a rather loose presentation of the upstream gas sector 
of the FSU countries. The consequence of neglecting these important market developments is that 
conclusions based on their analysis might change substantially once these market developments 
are accounted for. 
Therefore, the primary objective in developing a large-scale gas simulation model here is to 
“bridge” this gap. By doing this, a contribution is made to the literature on large-scale gas 
simulation models by creating an explicit representation of the FSU gas “region”. By using this 
Eurasian gas model we will be able to refine and obtain new insights into the strategic nature of 
gas relations between FSU countries that have been overlooked by previous economic and applied 
game-theoretic models. 
 
3. Model Description  
3.1. Modelling Framework 
In the natural gas modelling literature (Mathiesen et al., 1987; Golombek and Gjelsvik, 1995; 
Golombek et al., 1998; Boots et al., 2004; Zwart and Mulder, 2006; Holz et al., 2008; Egging et al., 
2008; Lise and Hobbs, 2008), a framework that is often used to model imperfect competition 
among market participants (usually, upstream producers and/or downstream suppliers) is the 
Cournot non-cooperative game. In this game, a Nash equilibrium is a set of actions (e.g., quantity 
of gas sales) such that no market participant (player) has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from 
his own actions, given his opponents’ actions (Tirole, 1988).  
In a gas market model, a player’s objective is to maximize his profit given a set of constraints 
(such as production or transmission capacities constraints). Under certain conditions, such as a 
concavity of objective functions (for maximization problems) and convexity of feasible regions, 
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are both necessary and sufficient conditions for 
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optimality of the maximization problem. Therefore, the essence of modelling the gas market 
system is to find an equilibrium that simultaneously satisfies each market participant’s KKT 
conditions for profit maximization and market clearing conditions (supply equals demand) in the 
model. Due to the necessity and sufficiency of KKTs for global optimality when the players’ 
problems are convex, this solution is a Nash equilibrium of the market game embodied in the 
model.  
To illustrate the underlying mathematical structure of the model here, consider a simple 
problem that a gas producer might face: 
 
   
   
             (1) 
subject to  
           (2) 
 
where q is a sales variable, p(q) is an affine inverse demand function, C(q) is a production cost 
function such that C’(q)>0, C’’(q)>0, and Q is the producer’s production capacity.  Then, the KKT 
conditions for (1) are 
 
      
  
  
            
(3) 
            (4) 
 
The symbol  denotes orthogonality, which in the case of (3) is a more compact way of expressing 
the following complementarity relationship: 
  
      
  
  
             (  
  
  
         )    
 
 
The set of conditions (3-4) is a set of complementarity conditions, or a complementarity 
problem.  If there are also equality conditions, the problem is known as a mixed complementarity 
problem (MCP).  Gathering these conditions for all optimization problems combined with all 
market clearing conditions (such as supply equals demand) in the gas market system forms a 
market equilibrium problem in the form of an MCP (Gabriel and Smeers, 2005). Applications of 
the MCP to energy market modelling are numerous (see, e.g., above-cited gas models; Smeers 
(1997) and Gabriel and Smeers (2005) provide an overview of natural gas market modelling using 
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the MCP, and Hobbs and Helman (2004) discuss the application of MCP to electricity market 
modelling). The existence and uniqueness of the results for a class of gas market models 
formulated as MCPs has been established by Gabriel et al. (2005a). Large-scale simulation models 
formulated as MCPs can be efficiently solved with commercial solvers such as PATH.  
 
3.2. Structural Assumptions 
3.2.1. Model Structure 
The scope of the model presented here is medium- to long-term.  European countries face 
substantial energy challenges over this period of time, such as declining indigenous production, 
reliance on a relatively small number of external gas exporters coupled with increasing risks of 
supply disruptions, and rising carbon prices that may increase demand. 
The structure of the model is summarised in Figure 1 (for European markets) and Figure 2 
(for the FSU gas sector). The model represents major gas producers and consumers in Europe and 
in the Former Soviet Union although the model could also be used to represent gas markets 
elsewhere in the world.  Producers and consumers are connected by pipeline networks and the 
LNG bilateral shipping network. Gas producers sell gas to suppliers10 who in turn re-sell to final 
markets. Gas producers can either export gas through pipelines (e.g., Producer i1, Figure 1) or as 
LNG (e.g., Producer i2 to Country C, Figure 1). In order to import LNG, consuming countries need 
regasification terminals (e.g., Country C, regasifier r1).  
 
                                                        
10 Hereinafter, the terms “supplier” and “trader” are used interchangeably. A gas supplier/trader is understood as a 
large utility company which has gas import contracts with upstream producers. A supplier/trader buys gas from 
producers and then re-sells it to final customers. 
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Figure 1: Schematic of the Structure of the European Sub-model 
 
The FSU gas sector model is based on the structure in Figure 2. For transparency, the 
activities of vertically integrated companies such as Gazprom and Naftogaz of Ukraine are 
modelled separately.11 Modelling each subsidiary of an integrated company as a separate player is 
similar to modelling the integrated company as one problem, provided that the relationships 
between subsidiary companies are modelled as competitive (price-taking). The proof of this 
statement is given in Appendix A. 
 
                                                        
11 Egging et al. (2008) modelled the activities of vertically integrated companies similarly. 
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Figure 2: Schematic of the Structure of the FSU Gas Sub-model 
 
It is assumed that each FSU gas market is dominated by a state-owned supplier, which is 
consistent with reality. For example, in Russia the dominant domestic supplier is “Mezhregiongaz” 
(Gazprom’s subsidiary), and in Ukraine it is “Gas of Ukraine”, a subsidiary of Naftogaz of Ukraine. 
(For simplicity, a domestic supplier like Gazprom Marketing or Naftogaz Marketing is called a 
“marketing” company in Figure 2.) Since gas companies are completely or majority state-owned, it 
is assumed that they have a legal obligation to supply the domestic market at regulated prices 
(Sagen and Tsygankova (2008) make a similar assumption in their model of the Russian gas 
sector).12  The suppliers meet domestic demand by purchasing gas from indigenous production or 
by importing gas from other entities. For example, in this model Gazprom Marketing buys gas 
from “independent” gas producers and from Gazprom Production to meet Russian domestic 
                                                        
12 For example, Ms. Vlada Rusakova, a member of Gazprom’s management committee and Head of Gazprom’s strategic 
planning department, stated that Gazprom is legally responsible for meeting domestic demand at regulated prices 
(Grivach, 2006). 
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demand. Similarly, in Ukraine Naftogaz Marketing purchases gas from Naftogaz production and it 
has to import gas from Gazprom Export, since domestic demand exceeds indigenous production.  
Gazprom Export is Gazprom’s subsidiary responsible for international marketing and export 
activities. Gazprom Export holds a monopoly position in exporting Russian gas to European and 
CIS markets (Gazprom, 2010b). It is assumed that to meet its export obligations Gazprom Export 
can purchase gas both from Gazprom Production and from Central Asian producers (Figure 2). In 
order to export gas, Gazprom Export has to contract transport services through Ukraine and 
Belarus, paying transit fees to Naftogaz Transit (through Ukraine) and Beltransgaz (through 
Belarus) respectively. Gazprom Export can also export gas directly to consuming countries (e.g., 
through Blue Stream to Turkey and through Nord Stream and South Stream to Europe, if the latter 
two projects materialize as planned by Gazprom). Gazprom plans to enter the global LNG market 
with anticipated LNG projects such as Shtokman and on the Yamal Peninsula; therefore, this 
model includes the possibility of Gazprom exporting gas as LNG. 
There are two connections between the FSU sub-model (Figure 2) and the European sub-
model (Figure 1). One is through Gazprom Export’s activities, as the blue oval in Figure 2 
“European Markets” is the market model in Figure 1.  The other is via the activities of transit 
countries (Ukraine and Belarus).  
 
3.2.2. Investment decisions in capacity expansion 
The model we implement is a static one, i.e. we are focusing only on operational decisions, 
such as how much of natural gas to produce and sale under limited production capacity or how 
much pipeline transport capacity to allocate given physical transport constraints. Investment in 
capacity expansion (such as production, pipeline and LNG capacity) is assumed exogenous to the 
model. Sensitivity analysis is done on major assumptions concerning physical constraints and 
results of this analysis are reported in Section X. Investment decisions concerning capacity 
expansion in a large-scale natural gas simulation model have been implemented, among other 
researchers, by Zwart and Mulder (2006), Lise and Hobbs (2008), Egging et al. (2009). 
 
3.2.3. Behaviour of market players in the model 
The model allows the following players to be simulated as having market power: 
1. producers (e.g., Producer i in Figure 1 or Gazprom Export in Figure 2) 
2. transit countries (e.g., Ukraine and Belarus in Figure 2) 
3. suppliers (e.g., Supplier y in Figure 1). 
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3.2.3.1. The successive exercise of market power  by producers and suppliers 
Producers are assumed to exert market power against downstream suppliers by playing a 
Cournot game with other upstream producers. If there is market power at both the supplier and 
production levels, a successive structure to the market game is assumed in which producers 
anticipate ({ la Stackelberg) how suppliers react. The GASMOD (Holz et al., 2008) and static 
GASTALE (Boots et al., 2004) models have a similar market structure.  Thus, the effective demand 
for gas producers reflects the exercise of market power by suppliers in their downstream market, 
and the slope of this effective demand is consistent with Cournot market power among the 
suppliers and the elasticity of final demand (Boots et al., 2004). 
The assumption that producers anticipate how suppliers react and that suppliers treat the 
border price as given (i.e., suppliers are price-takers with respect to border prices) is not entirely 
true concerning large suppliers, who may have some market power vis-{-vis gas producers.13 In 
contrast to the successive oligopoly relationship between producers and suppliers embodied in 
this model, the “traditional view” of the European gas markets is that producers and suppliers act 
simultaneously to extract the whole monopoly profit from the market and then share that profit 
according to their relative bargaining power (Smeers, 2008).  Compared to the successive 
oligopoly approach, such vertical coordination to exercise market power can result in greater 
sales and lower prices and therefore a smaller loss of welfare (Smeers, 2008).   
One way to accommodate such vertical coordination in this model’s structure is to assume 
that only producers (or only suppliers) exert market power and that suppliers (producers) 
receive a fixed mark-up from final gas prices, assuming that the relative bargaining power of 
suppliers (producers) reflects the mark-up they receive (Smeers, 2008). 
 
3.2.3.2. Representing transit market power 
In this model, transit market power is represented by the conjectured transit demand curve 
approach, which assumes that large transit countries (e.g., Ukraine and Belarus) believe that they 
face a declining effective demand curve for their services with an assumed slope, rather than 
deriving a slope based on market fundamentals. For example, if Ukraine conjectures that 
Gazprom’s transit quantity will diverge from its equilibrium value (x*) in proportion to the change 
                                                        
13 As Smeers (2008: p.19) noted:  
“Global oil and gas companies may have lost a lot of bargaining power to acquire resources in Russia and 
Kazakhstan and some are kicked out of Venezuela; still they retain bargaining power at the EU border when it 
comes to buying and marketing natural gas.” 
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in Ukraine’s transit fee from its equilibrium tf*, the resulting conjectured transit demand equation 
is 
 
                           (5) 
 
where  (x-x*) is a change in demand for transportation services that the transit country 
conjectures will happen if it changes its transit fee by (tf-tf*), and M is a conjectured slope for the 
transit demand curve. 
 
 
Figure 3: Ukraine’s Conjectured Transit Demand Curves 
 
In Figure 3, as an example, the transit demand curve for Ukraine under different values of 
conjectured slope M is plotted.14 It can be seen from this figure that if the slope of the transit 
demand curve is large enough (e.g., M=-110), then small changes in the transit fee will cause large 
changes in the transit quantities. This is possible if, for example, Gazprom has substantial 
transport capacities in alternative pipelines that “bypass” Ukraine. M=-110 was chosen as an 
example to represent the scenario of Gazprom building both the Nord Stream and South Stream 
pipelines (with a total capacity of 110 bcm). In this scenario, Ukraine conjectures that a unit 
increase in the transit fee may cause Gazprom to divert up to 110 bcm from Ukraine to alternative 
pipelines. This is why the transit demand curve is very steep (the “red” curve in Figure 3) and 
close to its short-run marginal cost (SRMC). In this scenario, Ukraine prices its transit service 
                                                        
14 The transit demand slopes plotted in Figure 3 are for expositional purpose only. The values of M={-1;-55;-110} are 
taken to clarify the meaning of M in the context of Gazprom’s bypass pipelines. Sensitivity analysis of M is provided in 
Appendix G. 
SRMC 
 
 
Page 15 of 107 
close to the competitive price, which is logical since if Gazprom has capacity that allows it to 
totally avoid Ukraine, then there is no market power left for Ukraine to exercise. The scenario of 
M=-55 corresponds to Gazprom building Nord Stream only (its transport capacity is 55 bcm). 
Where the conjectured slope is negligible (e.g., M=-1), Ukraine believes that any change in its 
transit fee has little effect on the quantity Gazprom ships through Ukraine, e.g., because Ukraine 
believes that Gazprom has no alternative export pipelines. In Figure 3 the transit demand curve 
with the slope M=-1 (“green” curve) is almost flat. 
In general, a conjectural variation shows a firm’s belief about the reaction (or variation) of 
another firm to potential adjustments in the first firm’s actions. In the case being considered here, 
this belief is captured in the form of an exogenous parameter, M, expressing the derivative of the 
transit quantity with respect to the transit price. It is easy to see that at the limit eq. (5) is the 
definition of the derivative of the transit quantity with respect to the transit fee: 
 
   
   
  
   
 
  
   
     
 
(6) 
where                         
 
Despite the appeal of its simplicity, the conjectural variations approach has theoretical 
limitations (Smeers, 2008). In general, economic theorists view conjectural variations as being the 
endogenous result of a dynamic game (Dockner, 1992); therefore, interpreting it as a constant 
parameter in a static model might be misleading (Friedman, 1983). Also, the firm’s conjecture 
about another firm’s response need not be correct (Friedman, 1983) and is highly dependent on 
precise market conditions. 
Therefore, the conjectured transit demand slope, M, is treated parametrically and a 
sensitivity analysis of this parameter is provided (see Appendix G). Despite these shortcomings,  
as has been shown above, the conjecture transit demand function has an intuitive and practical 
interpretation. Furthermore, it allows the model user to conveniently explore oligopolistic 
behaviour between competitive and monopolistic extremes.  
Finally, the application of the conjectural variations approach to representation of market 
power is quite common in the energy market modelling literature. For example, the conjectured 
supply function has been applied in natural gas market modelling (e.g., Egging and Gabriel (2006), 
Egging et al. (2008) and Zwart and Mulder (2006)). The conjectured supply function represents 
traders’ conjectures about variations in the supply from other traders in response to deviations in 
supply from the first trader. The conjectural variations approach is also widely used in the 
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electricity market modelling literature, for example in the form of the conjectured supply function 
and the conjectured transmission price function (Day et al., 2002; Hobbs and Rijkers, 2004; Hobbs 
et al., 2004). In (Hobbs and Rijkers, 2004; Hobbs et al., 2004), the conjectured transmission price 
function represents a generator’s belief about how its demand for transmission services affects 
the cost of transmitting power between two points. In this sense, the conjectured transmission 
price function, as applied in (Hobbs and Rijkers, 2004; Hobbs et al., 2004), has an inverse 
relationship to the conjectured transit demand function here because, in the first case, the 
generator believes that increasing demand for power transmission might drive up prices, whereas 
in this case the transit operator conjectures that an increase in the transit fee might depress 
transit flows through its pipelines. 
 
3.2.3.3. Bilateral market power in the FSU gas sector 
Modelling gas relations between buyers and sellers in FSU countries (Russia, Central Asia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) represents a challenge for several reasons. First, the gas sector in 
the FSU countries is heavily regulated.  Consequently, (i) natural gas is underpriced compared to 
its opportunity cost, and (ii) the gas “markets” are barely contestable, as the gas sector is 
dominated by a state-owned incumbent. Therefore, applying the Cournot framework (as it is 
applied to European markets) might not be appropriate for the FSU countries, where market 
fundamentals are not yet in place and where there is significant market power on the part of both 
buyers and sellers.  Alternatively, a cooperative bargaining framework might be suitable for the 
analysis of bilateral gas monopolies in the FSU. Therefore, the following bilateral gas relations are 
modelled using the cooperative bargaining framework (see Appendix B for details): 
1. Gazprom Export–Naftogaz Marketing 
2. Gazprom Export–Beltransgaz 
3. Gazprom Export–Central Asian gas producers 
4. Gazprom Marketing–Russian “independent” gas producers. 
 
3.2.3.4. Competitive access to the gas infrastructure 
Apart from producers, suppliers and transit countries, all other market participants (such as 
transmission system operators and operators of liquefaction and regasification terminals) in the 
model are assumed to possess no market power. Therefore, transmission costs and the costs of 
LNG services are priced efficiently, i.e., access to pipelines and LNG facilities is granted to those 
market players who most value the services (i.e., based on marginal willingness to pay). This 
would result in charges based on (long-run) marginal costs and a congestion premium in case of 
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pipeline or LNG facility saturation (Cremer et al., 2003; Gabriel and Smeers, 2005). Since 
congestion in natural gas transmission does not yet seem to be a major concern (Gabriel and 
Smeers, 2005), it is assumed here that users of pipelines and LNG facilities do not pay the 
congestion premium when pipelines and LNG facilities are saturated.15 Thus, these congestion 
fees are used as a mechanism to simulate the efficient allocation of scarce pipeline and LNG 
capacities (Gabriel et al., 2005a; Gabriel et al., 2005b; Zhuang and Gabriel, 2008). The assumption 
of the efficient pricing of access to gas pipelines and LNG infrastructure is consistent with other 
strategic gas models (e.g., (Gabriel et al., 2005a; Egging et al., 2008; Lise and Hobbs, 2008)).  
Smeers (2008) argues that efficient pricing of access to gas infrastructure is somewhat 
optimistic and diverges from the reality of gas market development in Europe (Smeers, 2008). 
However, recent agreements between private companies and European antitrust authorities (such 
as the capacity release programme agreed between GDF SUEZ, ENI, E.ON and EC) promise more 
competitive access to both transmission pipelines and LNG import terminals in Europe (EC, 2010; 
EC, 2009a; EC, 2009b). 
Further, to represent the case when free access to the gas infrastructure and competitive 
pricing are not the norm in European markets, a scenario is simulated where pipeline (cross-
border) and LNG import/export capacities are drastically limited, either because of physical 
saturation or because of restrictive practices found by the European Commission (EC, 2010, EC, 
2009a, EC, 2009b) (see Appendix G).16 The effect of this scenario on gas markets can be evaluated 
against the benchmark case of efficient access pricing for infrastructure. 
 
3.3. Model Notation 
3.3.1. Sets and Indices  
n∊N Set of all the nodes in the model, which includes the production, LNG liquefaction, 
regasification and transhipment nodes. 
N’(n) Set of nodes N’ adjacent to node n. Nodes are connected either by gas pipelines or 
by LNG bilateral shipping links. LNG bilateral shipping links are only formed 
between LNG liquefaction terminals and regasification terminals.  
r∊R⊂N Set of regasification nodes R, a subset of all the nodes.  
                                                        
15 The profit of the corresponding player is here adjusted ex-post to remove the resultant congestion costs. 
16 The “restrictive” pipeline access scenario is inspired by Smeers’ (2008: p.34) suggestion. 
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l∊L⊂N Set of liquefaction nodes L, a subset of all the nodes 
c∊C Set of ‘non-FSU’ consumption countries. N(c) is denoted as a set of gas off-taking 
nodes in country c. This could be either pipeline border points, LNG regasification 
terminals or indigenous production points. 
i∊I Set of all ‘non-FSU’ gas producing firms. For this model version there is an 
allocation of one firm to one production node17  
N(i) Set of nodes where i can produce gas 
y∊Y Set of all ‘non-FSU’ suppliers who buy gas from producers and exporters and re-sell 
it to final markets 
j∊J Set of all gas producers and exporters who sell gas to suppliers, Y. This includes all 
‘non-FSU’ producers, I, and Gazprom Export, G 
G Variables and parameters associated with Gazprom Export are denoted with the 
letter G  
f∊F Set of FSU consumption countries. N(f) is denoted as a set of gas off-taking nodes in 
country f. 
u∊U⊂N Set of entry nodes of transit pipelines (Ukraine and Belarus) 
u’∊U’(u)⊂ N Set of nodes u’ that are directly connected to node u 
k∊K Set of ‘FSU’ producers, K 
t∊T(f) Set of suppliers that serve node f (In the implementation in this paper there is one 
supplier per consumption node, f, but more general implementations can be made). 
K(G) Set of ‘FSU’ producers who have commercial relations with Gazprom Export (G) 
(i.e. buying/selling gas) 
K(t) Set of ‘FSU’ producers who have commercial relations with supplier a t (i.e. 
buying/selling gas) 
T(k) Set of suppliers, T, who have commercial (gas buying/selling) relations with a 
                                                        
17 The exception is Russia, where two firms are assigned - Gazprom and “independent” producers. If required, the 
allocation of firms to different production sites can be easily altered in the model. 
 
 
Page 19 of 107 
producer, k (i.e. buying/selling gas) 
T(G) Set of suppliers, T , who have commercial relations with Gazprom Export 
(purchasing and selling gas) 
N(k) Set of production nodes, N, where producer k can be located 
N(t) Set of nodes, N, through which supplier t can import gas 
 
3.3.2. Variables 
For clarity of presentation, an asterisk (*) is used to denote variables that are exogenous to a 
particular market player’s maximization problem.  The variables might be exogenous to one or 
more players, but such variables are endogenously determined in the model. This is done either 
through market clearing conditions or through the maximization problems of other players. 
Subscripts are used for indexation, and superscripts denote that a particular variable (or 
parameter) belongs to a particular type of player in the model. For example,  
     
  means the quantity of gas purchased by supplier y from upstream firm j and re-sold in 
market c through node n. Superscript Y denotes the sales variable for suppliers operating in 
European markets.  Further, where necessary, buying and selling relationships between players 
are specified using the following notation: leftwards arrow (←) to denote “from” and rightwards 
arrow (→) to denote “to”. For example,     
    means gas purchases by supplier T from producer K, 
and     
    means gas sales by producer K to supplier T. 
 
3.3.2.1. European sub-model 
Supplier’s Decision Variables 
     
  Quantity of gas purchased by supplier y from upstream firm j and re-
sold in market c through node n.  
Bcm/a 
Producer’s Decision Variables  
    
  Producing firm i’s total gas supply to all suppliers in market c through 
node n 
Bcm/a 
     
 
 Producer i’s transportation variable from node n to the next node n’ Bcm/a 
      
  Producer i’s LNG shipping variable from liquefaction node n∊N(l(i)) to Bcm/a 
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regasification node n’∊N’(r) 
   
 
 Producer i’s production at node n∊N(i) Bcm/a 
TSO’s Decision Variables 
    
   
 TSO decision variable regarding gas flows from node n to the next node 
n’ 
Bcm/a 
LNG Decision Variables 
  
   
 LNG liquefaction quantities at node n∊N(l) Bcm/a 
   
     
 LNG regasification quantities at regasification node n’∊ N’(r) Bcm/a 
Price Variables 
pc Average consumer retail gas price in consumption country c US$/tcm 
bpc Border price for bulk gas in market c US$/tcm 
tcnn’ Transmission price from n to n’ including congestion premium US$/tcm 
   
     
 LNG regasification price at node n’∊N’(r) US$/tcm 
  
   
 LNG Liquefaction price at node n∊N(l) US$/tcm 
 
3.3.2.2. FSU Sub-model 
Supplier’s Decision Variables 
   
 
 Supplier t gas sales for final consumption in market f Bcm/a 
    
   
 Supplier t gas purchases from producer k and gas producing node 
n∊N(k) 
Bcm/a 
  
   
 Supplier t gas purchases from Gazprom Export (G) Bcm/a 
Producer’s Decision Variables 
    
   
 Producer k gas sales (produced from node n∊N(k)) to supplier t  Bcm/a 
   
   
 Producer k gas sales (produced from n∊N(k)) to Gazprom Export (G) Bcm/a 
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 Producer k gas production from n∊N(k) Bcm/a 
Gazprom Export 
   
 
 Gazprom Export’s total gas sales to all suppliers in market c∊C(G) 
through node n∊N(c) 
Bcm/a 
    
   
 Gazprom Export’s gas sales to supplier t∊T(f) in consumption country f 
through node n ∊N(t) 
Bcm/a 
   
   
 Gazprom Export’s gas purchases from producer k  and node n∊N(k) Bcm/a 
    
 
 Transport variable from n to n’ Bcm/a 
     
 
 LNG shipping variable from n∊N(l(G))  to n’∊N’(r) Bcm/a 
Natural Gas Transit 
tfuu’ Decision variable representing the transit fee through pipeline (u,u’) US$/tcm 
    
  
 Transit operator’s decision about how much transit capacity through 
(u,u’) to render  to Gazprom Export 
Bcm/a 
Price Variables 
    
   
 Price of gas produced from n∊N(k) by producer k to supplier t US$/tcm 
   
   
 Gazprom Export’s sales (border) price to supplier t US$/tcm 
   
   
 Sales prices of gas produced from n∊N(k) by producer k to Gazprom 
Export 
US$/tcm 
    
  
 Congestion premium through transit pipeline (u,u’) US$/tcm 
 
3.3.3. Exogenous Parameters and Functions 
3.3.3.1. European sub-model 
Supplier’s Parameters/Functions 
DCc Unit distribution cost in market c US$/tcm 
Rc Number of suppliers serving market c  
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  0-1 parameter:   
 =0 if suppliers serving final market c are 
competitive players, and  
 =1 if those suppliers are instead 
Cournot players in the final market c 
 
Producer’s Parameters/Functions 
TPCi(.) Producer i’s total production cost  US$ 
     
  
 Producer i’s production capacity as available at node n Bcm/a 
   
 
 0-1 parameter:    
 =0 if producer i behaves competitively, and 
   
 =1 if producers are Cournot players in market c 
 
TSO’s Parameters/Functions 
     
       Total transmission cost to transport gas from n∊N to n’∊N’(n) US$ 
      
   
 Capacity of pipeline (n,n’) Bcm/a 
       
     Loss factor due to fuel consumption by compressors along 
pipeline (n,n’) 
fraction of gas 
transport per 
km 
LNG Parameters/Functions 
SCnn’ LNG unit shipping cost from n∊N(l) to n’∊N’(r) US$/tcm 
         Total cost of gas liquefaction (assumed linear in this model, 
although more general formulations are possible) 
US$ 
    
   
 Total liquefaction capacity at node n∊N(l) Bcm/a 
           Total cost (linear) of LNG regasification US$ 
     
     
 Total regasification capacity available at node n’∊N’(r) Bcm/a 
       
    Total loss factor during LNG liquefaction, shipping and 
regasification from n’ to n 
fraction of gas 
shipments 
 
3.3.3.2. FSU Sub-model: 
Supplier’s Parameters/Functions 
DCf Unit distribution cost in market f US$/tcm 
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Df(.) Demand function in market f , which depends on the regulated 
average retail price   
      
Bcm/a 
Producer’s Parameters/Functions 
TCPk(.) Producer k’s total production cost  US$ 
     
  
 Producer k’s production capacity available at node n∊N(k) Bcm/a 
Gazprom Export’s Parameters/Functions 
  
 
 0-1 parameter:   
 =0 if Gazprom Export behaves 
competitively in market c,  
 =1 if Gazprom Export is { la 
Cournot in market c 
 
Natural Gas Transit Parameters/Functions 
     
      Total transit cost (linear) through pipeline (u,u’) US$/tcm 
     Conjectured transit demand slope through transit pipeline 
(u,u’),    <0 
Bcm/US$/tcm 
      
  
 Transportation capacity through transit pipeline (u,u’) Bcm/a 
    
  
 0-1 parameter:     
  =0 if transit through pipeline (u,u’) is 
priced competitively, and    
  =1 if the transit country is 
assumed to exercise market power vis-a-vis Gazprom Export 
over the transit pipeline (u,u’) 
 
 
3.4. Profit Maximization Problems 
3.4.1. European Sub-model 
3.4.1.1. Supplier Model  
The supplier’s objective is to maximize its profit (  
 ) from purchasing gas from upstream 
firm j through node n at border price     
  and re-selling it to final market c: 
 
   
     
   
  
  ∑      
 (       
     )
             
 (7) 
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The border price,     
 , is exogenous to the supplier’s problem, however it is determined 
endogenously in the model (as denoted by the asterisk). Supplier y has to pay a distribution cost, 
DCc, to sell gas to the final customers in c. Further, it is assumed that suppliers treat the border 
price as given, i.e. they are price-takers with respect to border prices. This formulation of the 
supplier’s problem has been used previously, for instance by Boots et al. (2004). 
The following are the first-order (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker, KKT) conditions for the downstream 
profit maximization problem (7): 
 
       
  *       
      
   
      
      
 +         (8) 
 
Then the expression for the border price is derived from (8) as follows:  
 
    
         
   
      
      
       (9) 
 
In this model version, for each country, c, one aggregate demand function is assumed, i.e. gas 
consumption is not differentiated by sector (e.g., industrial, household, power sectors, etc.); more 
detailed formulations of the demand side are, of course, possible (e.g., (Egging et al., 2008; Lise 
and Hobbs, 2008)). Following Boots et al. (2004), a linear demand function for natural gas is 
assumed as follows: 
 
        ∑      
 
             
      (10) 
 
where Bn>0, An<0 are parameters to be calibrated at assumed elasticity and price-quantity pairs 
for the base year (2009) (see Appendix C, Table C.1). 
 
Similarly to Boots et al., (2004), it is assumed that suppliers in market c are identical18 and 
cannot be discriminated between, so bpyc=bpc and furthermore the sales variable of upstream firm 
j to market c is     
  ∑      
 
 . If supplies to market c are strictly positive, then by taking into 
account the assumed symmetry of suppliers in market c we can use expression (10) to express the 
border price for market c as follows: 
                                                        
18 As Smeers (2008) argues, this assumption does not correspond to the reality of European downstream gas markets. 
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     ̂   ̂ ∑          
         
 (11) 
where:   
 ̂              (12) 
 ̂    [  
 (
    
  
)       
  ]       (13) 
 
The latter expression accounts for whether the supplier market is assumed to be competitive or 
Cournot (  
 =0 if suppliers serving market c are competitive players, and  
 =1 if suppliers are 
Cournot players). 
 
3.4.1.2. Producer Model 
The producer’s objective is to maximize its profit (  
 ) by choosing how much gas to sell to 
market c (    
 ) through node n.  It also has to choose the production quantity (   
 ) at node n, 
paying total production costs (TPCi). Following Golombek and Gjelsvik (1995), Egging et al. (2008) 
and Lise and Hobbs (2008), the total production cost is assumed to be an increasing function of 
the production rate    
  (for details see Appendix C, Table C.6). The production cost function (TPCi) 
is assumed to be separable over time, so inter-temporal production constraints and costs (arising 
from, e.g., depletion effects) are not considered.19  More general functions could be considered 
(e.g., (Zwart and Mulder, 2006; Gabriel et al., 2003)). Apart from production costs, transport 
expenses from nodes n to n’ are also incurred, either through pipelines (     
 ) and paying 
transmission costs (     
 ), or through LNG vessels (      
 ), paying liquefaction (  
    ), shipping 
(     ) and regasification costs (   
      ). The resultant producer’s maximization problem is as 
follows: 
       
   
    
     
       
        
   
  
 
 ∑     
    
             
 ∑         
  
      
 ∑ ∑      
      
 
           
 ∑ ∑       
 (  
              
      )
           
  
(14) 
subject to  
                                                        
19 It should be noted that the producer model presented here is only an approximation to the complicated engineering 
problems of petroleum extraction in the real world. 
 
 
Page 26 of 107 
     ∑ [     
        
  (         
    )     
  (         
   )      
 ]
        
    
  
    
                    
(15) 
   
       
       
             (16) 
 
As indicated by eq. (15) (preservation of mass balance at node n), the gas pipeline network is 
modelled as a transhipment problem with a constant proportion of losses.20    Detailed technical 
phenomena, such as line pack or nonlinear pipeline shipment costs as a function of total flow, are 
not considered; more sophisticated representations are possible (e.g.,(O’Neill et al., 1979; De Wolf 
and Smeers, 1996; Midthun et al., 2009)).  
The KKT conditions for (14) are 
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 )     (17) 
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 )    
(18) 
      
              
          
     
     (19) 
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 )    (20) 
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 ∑ [     
        
  (         
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  (         
   )      
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 )
   
(21) 
    
          
      
       
      (22) 
 
Note that in (17) the mark-up term 
    
     
     
  is multiplied with the exogenous 0-1 parameter 
   
  (   
 =0 if producer i behaves competitively, and    
 =1 if producer i behaves { la Cournot in 
market c). 
 
                                                        
20 Flow conservation at a particular node is expressed as inequality rather than equality as this allows the model to be 
solved more efficiently. The solution of the model with flow conservation expressed as equalities is the same as in the 
case of inequalities. 
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3.4.1.3. Efficient TSO Model (Non-FSU) 
It is assumed that the transmission cost through the pipeline (n,n’) is priced efficiently, i.e. it 
is assumed that TSOs behave competitively and grant access to the pipeline infrastructure to those 
market players who value transmission services the most. This would result in a transmission 
charge based on marginal costs and a congestion premium in case pipeline (n,n’) is saturated 
(Cremer et al., 2003; Gabriel and Smeers, 2005). Thus, the TSO objective is to 
 
   
    
     
     ∑ [    
        
       
        
    ]
                
 (23) 
subject to  
    
          
         
                       (24) 
 
KKT conditions  
 
     
             
    (     
  
      
        
    
     
        
   )    (25) 
     
             
         
          
       (26) 
 
3.4.1.4. LNG Model 
In order to export LNG, upstream firm j liquefies natural gas and then ships it to consuming 
markets, where the LNG will be regasified for final consumption. As with TSOs (other than 
Ukraine and Belarus) who manage transmission pipelines, it is assumed that liquefiers and 
regasifiers behave competitively and price LNG services efficiently (this is consistent with 
previous gas models where the LNG value chain has been explicitly modelled; see, e.g., (Egging et 
al.,2008)). 
Further, it is assumed that the producer retains ownership of the gas and contracts 
transport services, as opposed to a situation where the transporter buys the gas from the 
producer at the point of liquefaction.  Since it is assumed that LNG services (liquefaction and 
regasification) are priced competitively, this assumption does not change the results (see 
Appendix A for the proof of this statement).   
 
Liquefaction 
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The objective of liquefiers is to maximize the value of liquefaction services (27) given their 
constraints on liquefaction capacity (28):21 
 
   
  
   
       
     
             
     (27) 
subject to  
  
        
    (  
     )         (28) 
 
The KKT conditions for (27) are 
 
   
           
    (  
     
         
    
   
   
   
   )    (29) 
   
          
    (  
        
   )    (30) 
 
Regasification 
LNG needs to be regasified in order to supply final customers. The regasifier maximizes the 
profit gained from the provision of regasification services (31) subject to capacity constraints 
(32): 
 
   
   
     
          
        
                
  
       (31) 
subject to  
   
           
          
                   (32) 
 
The KKT conditions for (31) are 
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     )    (33) 
    
             
      (   
           
     )    (34) 
 
                                                        
21 After solving the model, where appropriate the profit of the liquefaction operator is added to the overall profit of 
the producer who in reality owns the liquefaction facility.  Since the liquefaction facility is priced competitively, this 
does not alter the results. Proof of this statement is in Appendix A. 
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3.4.2. FSU sub-model 
3.4.2.1. Supplies to the domestic market 
In the following, the modelling of gas supplies for consumption in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova is discussed. Each of these markets (f) is served by the state-owned gas supplier, t. 
The supplier’s main goal is to meet domestic demand, Df, at the regulated price,   
   
. The supplier 
t can do so by purchasing gas from indigenous production (    
   ) or by importing gas from 
Gazprom Export (  
   ), paying them the wellhead price (    
    ) and border price (   
    ) 
respectively. Thus, the objective of the supplier is to maximize its profit (  
 ): 22 
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3.4.2.2. Gas Production 
The objective of a gas production company is to maximize its profit (  
 ) by deciding how 
much to produce (   
 ) from each region (      ) and how much to sell to each supplier t and 
                                                        
22 Note that since   
    is exogenously fixed, (35) is equivalent to the cost minimization problem. 
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Gazprom Export (G). Producers sell gas at the wellhead prices (    
          
    ), subject to 
production constraints (44-45).  
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3.4.2.3. Gazprom Export 
The objective of Gazprom Export is to maximize its profit (  ) from gas sales to the export 
market, c, through node n (   
 ) at the border price (bpc) and from exporting to FSU markets f 
through node n (    
   ) at the border price    
    . In order to export gas it has to purchase gas 
(   
   ) at prices (   
    ) set by gas producers. Also, it has to transport gas to final markets (    
 ), 
paying a transmission price (     
  including transit fees through Ukraine and Belarus). The 
resultant profit maximization problem for Gazprom Export is: 
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Gazprom Export maximizes its profit (51) subject to flow conservation constraints (52). The KKT 
conditions for (51) are 
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Note that, similarly to producer i, Gazprom Export’s mark-up term 
    
    
    
  is multiplied with 
the exogenous parameter   
  (  
 =0 if Gazprom Export behaves competitively in market c,   
 =1 if 
Gazprom Export is a Cournot player in market c). 
 
3.4.2.4. Transit pricing through Ukraine and Belarus 
The transit country maximizes its profit from rendering transit services to Gazprom Export 
as follows: 
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 (59) 
subject to  
    
         
        
                    (60) 
 
The first term           
   in the brackets is the revenue gained due to the exercise of market 
power, while the second term is the profit under efficient transit pricing (similarly to the efficient 
TSO model (23)), where     
    is the congestion premium determined by market clearing 
conditions (74). As was discussed earlier, to represent market power in gas transits through 
Ukraine and Belarus, the conjectured transit demand curve approach is applied with the following 
slope: 
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Then, the following are the first-order (KKT) conditions for the transit country profit 
maximization problem (59): 
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If     
          , then the transit price through pipeline (u,u’)  that Gazprom Export should pay is 
 
     
      
    
    
 
    
        (65) 
3.4.3. Market Clearing Conditions 
In this section all the market clearing conditions that are needed to equate demand with 
supply are gathered. The following market clearing constraints (66) require that the average final 
price matches the inverse demand function at the equilibrium point: 
 
  
  (     ∑      
 
             
)         (66) 
and the following market clearing conditions (67) define the effective border price (as derived in 
Section 3.4.1.1.) : 
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Market clearing conditions (68) equate demand for transmission services through pipelines 
(n,n’) with TSO’s supplying of such services:  
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The market clearing conditions necessary to equate supply and demand for liquefaction 
services are as follows: 
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 +
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         )          (69) 
and the market clearing constraints below ensure that demand for regasification service equals 
supplies: 
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The wellhead prices that producer k receives are obtained from the market-clearing 
conditions that balance supply and demand for gas: 
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The market clearing conditions that ensure that the total purchases (  
   ) by supplier t 
from Gazprom Export are equal to the total sales by Gazprom Export (∑     
   
 ) to that supplier 
through the border points (n∊N(t)) are as follows: 
 
∑    
   
 
   
          
                       (73) 
 
The congestion premium (    
 ) through transit pipelines (u,u’) is defined through the 
market-clearing conditions that ensure that the transit quantity demanded by Gazprom Export 
(    
 ) through pipelines (u,u’) equals the transit capacity supply (    
  ): 
 
    
       
                     
                        (74) 
 
Gathering all the KKT conditions and market clearing constraints presented above forms the 
MCP, which is coded in GAMS and solved with PATH solver. Since the objective functions of the 
maximization problems of market participants are concave and the associated constraints are 
convex, the solution to the MCP is a simultaneously global optimum to all the individual 
maximization problems in the model. Thus, the solution to the MCP is also a Nash equilibrium of 
the market game implemented in this model. 
 
 
 
Page 35 of 107 
4. Model Validation and Results from Sensitivity Analysis 
A validation of the model has been performed as follows. First, the model’s results were 
verified to confirm that all the constraints, such as production, pipeline and LNG capacities, as well 
as energy balances at each node are satisfied by the solutions. Secondly, the numerical results 
produced by the model have been compared with real market data for the years 2008 and 2009 
(see Appendix G, Tables D.1a, D.1b and D.2).  
Comparison of the model with historical data shows that in general the model’s results are in 
line with actual market outcomes for the years 2008 and 2009. In particular, model validation 
with 2008-2009 data shows that among three assumptions on market structure, namely (i) 
double marginalization (producers and traders exert market power in sequence), (ii) upstream 
oligopoly (only producers exert market power), and (iii) perfect competition, the upstream 
oligopoly market assumption produces results that are closer to the observed market data (price 
and consumption) than the results under the other two market assumptions. The double 
marginalization assumption produces much higher final prices and lower quantities than the 
other solutions. This is generally in line with the theory of double marginalization (Spengler, 
1950). Furthermore, these prices are much higher (and quantities much lower) than in reality, 
consistent with Smeers’ (2008) observation that double marginalisation is an inappropriate 
characterization for European gas markets. On the other hand, the perfect competition 
assumption inflates final gas consumption quite substantially compared to real market data. 
Consequently, the average final prices in European markets are much lower than the observed 
real prices. Therefore, motivated by these results, the upstream oligopoly market structure was 
selected for the Base case scenario.  
It should be noted that there is one common feature in the three market power scenarios - 
diversity of the gas sources for particular markets plays a crucial role in determining prices and 
consumption. Less diverse countries in terms of supply sources always suffer higher prices and 
lower consumption compared to the prices and consumption of those countries that have more 
diversified supply sources. In contrast, countries with a diverse supply portfolio enjoy lower 
prices and higher consumption than would be the case otherwise. In general, this observation is 
line with economic intuition regarding market power and competition. Therefore, the model 
behaves in a predictable way which is in line with fundamental economic intuition and theory.  
Sensitivity analyses (see Appendix G, Tables G.3 and G.4) show that the model’s results are 
fairly robust in terms of major structural assumptions. Particularly, the Base Case solution was 
tested against ten alternative scenarios of structural assumptions (such as the elasticity of 
demand parameter, gas demand growth, production, pipeline, LNG import and export capacities) 
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(see Appendix G, Box G.1). The sensitivity results are reported in terms of a robustness index that 
describes the responsiveness of the model output to a change in input parameters in a manner 
analogous to the elasticity concept (see Appendix G, eq. G.1). As a result, among these alternative 
assumptions, the most critical input parameters appear to be (in order of importance): (i) the 
production capacities of the two largest producers in the model – Russia and Norway, and (ii) the 
elasticity of demand. 
Moreover, the direction of changes in input parameters matters. Thus, a decrease in the 
production capacities of Russia and Norway is very critical to the model’s results (prices, 
consumption, profits and welfare), whereas an increase in production capacities of these two 
countries has little effect on the model’s outputs. Similarly, a decrease in the elasticity of the 
demand parameter is more critical to the model’s results than an increase. In general, a one 
percentage point (p.p.) decrease in the production forecast of Russia and Norway relative to the 
Base Case forecast changes the final prices by more than 0.5 p.p. for most of the countries in this 
model (with a few countries seeing changes in prices of more than 1 p.p.), whereas a 1 p.p. 
decrease in the elasticity parameter produces an average increase in final prices of 0.37 p.p.  
It should be noted that, contrary to our expectation, variations in pipeline capacities (cross-
border) have only a marginal impact on the model’s results. For example, a 1 p.p. decrease in 
cross-border pipeline capacities relative to the Base Case assumption increases final prices by an 
average of 0.04 p.p. and decreases model-wide consumption by 0.03 p.p. compared to the Base 
Case solution (see Appendix G, Tables G.3 and G.4). Similar sensitivity results were obtained 
regarding the LNG import/export capacities. Therefore, although the assumption of efficient 
pricing of access to and congestion in infrastructure capacities in this model diverges from the 
European market reality, these results indicate that these assumptions might not drastically bias 
the model results. 
In general, changes in other inputs (e.g., demand forecast) have very little effect on the 
model’s results – a 1 p.p. change in all other input parameters only changes the model results by 
0-0.2 p.p.  
Finally, sensitivity scenarios (see Appendix G, Box G.2) were run to check the robustness of 
the model’s results against different assumptions about the conjectured transit demand slope, M. 
The results show that different assumptions about the transit conjecture parameter only 
substantially affect the profits of transit countries (see Appendix G, Table G.5). However, in 
general, different conjectured transit demand slopes only slightly modify the model results (such 
as final prices and consumption) - within a range of 1% from the Base Case results. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1. Base Case Results 
Figure 4 reports natural gas consumption by sources obtained from the Base Case solution. 
In this scenario, total gas consumption in Europe will increase from 622 bcm in 2010 to 685 bcm 
by 2030 (+0.5% CAGR). The increase in gas consumption in Europe will be increasingly met with 
external gas supplies. Gas imports through pipelines from Russia, Norway and Algeria will total 
371 bcm in 2030 (+0.6% CAGR from 2010). LNG will import a total of 230 bcm in 2030 or 34% of 
total consumption (in 2010 LNG imports constitute 26% of total European gas consumption). 
Indigenous gas production in Europe will decline steadily through to 2030 (-2.8% CAGR) and total 
83 bcm. 
 
 
Figure 4: Breakdown of Gas Consumption by Sources for European Countries23 
 
It should be noted that total gas consumption in Europe peaks in 2025 (Figure 4) at the level 
of 692 bcm and declines to 685 bcm in 2030. This is because the model does not include 
investment decision in production and transport infrastructure; therefore, gas supplies at the end 
of the modelling period (2025-2030) are rather limited and constraint the growth in natural gas 
consumption.  
                                                        
23 Includes all countries as reported in Table C.1 (Appendix C) except for the FSU countries 
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The development in final gas prices obtained from the Base Case solution differs slightly 
between regions (Figure 5). Natural gas prices may differ substantially among countries due to 
both the geography of production and consumption (such as transport costs involved in delivering 
gas from producers to consumers) and market structures (such as competition between gas 
producers). Therefore, due to the lack of upstream gas competition, the final (quantity-weighted) 
average price for Eastern Europe and Balkans is 16% higher, on average, than the gas price for 
Western and Southern Europe. Moreover, Western and Southern European gas prices see a slight 
decrease between 2010 and 2015 due to increased LNG regasification and the new pipeline 
capacities to be commissioned during this period. In general, the (quantity-weighted) average 
prices of the two regions increases at a CAGR of around 1.7% through to 2030.  
 
 
Figure 5: Dynamics of Average Final Prices 
 
Figure 6 shows the Base Case result for Russian natural gas exports to Europe through 
different transit routes (for details of current Russian gas export routes see Appendix H: Table 
H.1). In the Base Case (Figure 6) it is assumed that Russia’s bypass pipelines, Nord Stream and 
South Stream, come online gradually (Nord Stream and South Stream are assumed to be fully 
operational in 2012 and 2017 respectively). It can be seen from Figure 6 that once these two 
projects are built Russian gas transits through Ukraine will be diverted to these two projects. 
Total transit through Ukraine in 2017 (after South Stream’s operation) reduces to 22 bcm, versus 
128 bcm in 2011. Therefore, once the bypass projects are built Ukraine’s role as a transit country 
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becomes marginal and Gazprom only uses Ukraine’s transit system to transport some gas to 
Moldova, Poland, Slovakia and Romania, i.e. to those markets where it is assumed that gas cannot 
be reached with bypass pipelines. On the other hand, it can be seen from Figure 6 that there is no 
impact from bypass pipelines on transit flows through the Belarusian section of the Yamal-Europe 
pipeline. 
 
Figure 6: Russian Gas Exports to Europe by Main Transit Pipelines 
 
5.2. Investment in Nord Stream, Market Power and Social Welfare 
The aim of this section is to show the model’s capability by analysing the effects of different 
market structures on changes in social welfare resulting from Nord Stream investment. 
 
5.2.1. Assumptions and Scenarios  
  For this analysis, Base Case data are assumed (as outlined in Appendix C). However, it is 
assumed that South Stream is not built. This assumption is required to focus solely on Nord 
Stream evaluation (note that in the Base Case scenario both the Nord Stream and South Stream 
pipelines are built).24 Table 1 reports the market power scenarios analysed here.  
 
 
                                                        
24 Investment in South Stream and its interactions with Nord Stream will be analysed in a forthcoming paper 
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Table 1: Market Power Scenarios 
 Successive 
market power   
Double 
marginalization  
Upstream 
oligopoly 
Perfect 
Competition 
Cournot Producers √ √ √  
Cournot Traders √ √   
Transit market 
power 
√    
 
In the successive market power scenario it is assumed that, apart from producers and 
traders, transit countries also behave imperfectly. In this scenario, transit market power is 
represented with the conjectured transit demand function. The application of this function 
requires the specification of the slope      of the conjectured transit demand curve. This slope 
can be interpreted as the transit country’s belief about Gazprom’s ability (measured as a fraction 
of existing transit capacities) to divert gas from transit pipelines if the transit fee is raised by some 
amount (e.g., by US$1/tcm):  
 
              
                                                                                                      (75) 
 
where       
   is the capacity of the transit pipeline (u,u’) and F is a percentage number (details of 
transit pipeline capacities are documented in Appendix C, Table C.3). For the purpose of this 
analysis, an arbitrary small F (1%) was chosen which results in a rather small conjectured slope.25  
This small conjectured transit slope was chosen to simulate the hypothetical case of transit 
countries believing they have substantial market power vis-a-vis Gazprom.26 A sensitivity analysis 
with alternative assumptions about the conjectured transit demand slope is presented in 
Appendix G. 
When transit countries are assumed not to exert market power (double marginalization. 
upstream oligopoly and perfect competition cases), their transit fees are exogenously fixed at 
2010 levels (for details of the transit fees through Ukraine and Belarus see Appendix C). 
In scenarios when traders are exercising their market power (i.e. successive market power 
and double marginalization scenarios), it is assumed that each gas market is served by four 
traders, which generally corresponds to the current structure of most Western European gas 
                                                        
25 For example, the existing transit capacity through Ukraine to Western Europe (i.e., Ukraine-Slovak border) is 92.6 
bcm/a; thus, the result of applying F=1% is a conjectured slope of M=-0.926. This conjectured slope expresses 
Ukraine’s belief (not necessarily correct) that an increase in transit fees might force Gazprom to divert gas from 
Ukraine by up to 0.926 bcm/a (if this proves more efficient for Gazprom). 
26 This case was more realistic during the 1990s and early 2000s, when Gazprom had no alternative export routes 
other than using Ukrainian and Belarusian pipelines to export gas to Europe. 
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markets. However, number of traders in each market is treated parametrically and sensitivity 
analyses are provided in Appendix I.  
For the analysis of Nord Stream investment, data on the costs of the pipeline project and 
corresponding transport costs are required. The methodology and data used for costing the Nord 
Stream system are discussed in Appendix E and F. The results of the estimation of transport costs 
through the Nord Stream system are in Appendix C, Table C.9. 
 
5.2.2. Impact on Gazprom and Transit Countries 
Table 2 summarizes Gazprom’s and transit countries’ annualized profits under different 
scenarios. The annualized profits were calculated at a 10% discount rate over the period of 25 
years.  
 
Table 2: Gazprom’s and Transit Countries’ Annualized Profit (US$ bn/year) 
      Gazprom 
Transit 
Countries 
Successive 
market power 
Nord Stream is built [1] 80.4 1.3 
Nord Stream is not built [2] 77.7 3.4 
Changes [3]=[1]-[2] 2.7 -2.1 
Double 
Marginalization 
Nord Stream is built [4] 80.8 1.2 
Nord Stream is not built [5] 80.5 1.7 
Changes [6]=[4]-[5] 0.3 -0.5 
Upstream 
Oligopoly 
Nord Stream is built [7] 112.1 1.8 
Nord Stream is not built [8] 109.5 2.5 
Changes [9]=[7]-[8] 2.6 -0.7 
Perfect 
Competition 
Nord Stream is built [10] 86.4 2.7 
Nord Stream is not built [11] 90.7 2.7 
Changes [12]=[10]-[12] -4.3 0.0 
 
From Table 2 one can see that the annualized value of the Nord Stream system to Gazprom is 
positive in all cases except in the perfect competition case. In the successive market power 
scenario, the positive value of Gazprom’s investment in the Nord Stream project (US$ 2.7 bn/y) is 
majorly driven by transport cost reduction (see Table 3). The reduction in total transport cost is 
due to:  
(i) lower unit transport cost from Russia’s major gas producing regions to Germany 
(Russia’s largest market in Western Europe) using the Nord Stream route than 
using the Ukrainian route (see Figure 7), and  
(ii) reductions in transit fees through Ukraine and Belarus once the Nord Stream 
pipeline is operational (see Figure 8). This decrease in transit fees is due to lower 
transit flows through their pipelines (gas flows are diverted to the Nord Stream 
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system). Since transit market power is modelled using a conjectured transit demand 
function (with an assumed negative slope), lower transit flows reduce transit fees. 
 
Table 3: Gazprom’s Total Transport Cost and Gas Exports to Europe over 25 years 
    
Transport 
cost 
(US$ bn) 
Gas 
Exports 
(bcm) 
Cost per 
unit 
(US$/tcm) 
    [1] [2] [3]=[1]/[2] 
Successive 
market power 
Nord Stream is built 348 3645 95.4 
Nord Stream is not built 379 3436 110.2 
Double 
Marginalization 
Nord Stream is built 340 3823 89.1 
Nord Stream is not built 319 3634 87.7 
Upstream 
Oligopoly 
Nord Stream is built 445 5195 85.7 
Nord Stream is not built 411 4681 87.7 
Perfect 
Competition 
Nord Stream is built 541 6551 82.6 
Nord Stream is not built 436 5331 81.8 
 
 
Figure 7: Transportation Costs from Russia to Germany 
Note: Unit transport cost through the Nord Stream system was calculated assuming that the system would be fully 
utilized (lower utilization of the transport system would increase its unit transport cost). The Belarusian route in this 
figure is the Northern Light pipeline system, not the Yamal-Europe pipeline which is owned by Gazprom. The final 
delivery point for the Ukrainian and Belarusian Northern Light routes is the German-Czech Border (Olbernhau). The 
final delivery point for the Nord Stream route is Greifswald, Germany (the end point of the offshore Nord Stream). 
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Figure 8: Transit fees through Ukraine and Belarus under the Successive Market Power 
Scenario27 
Note: the Belarusian route in this figure is the Northern Light pipeline system, not the Yamal-Europe pipeline which is 
owned by Gazprom; NS – Nord Stream  
 
 In the double marginalization case, the annualized value of Nord Stream investment to 
Gazprom is positive, but rather marginal (US$ 0.3 bn/y). Strategic behaviour by traders lowers gas 
sales for final consumption, and thus modifies both final and border prices and, consequently, the 
margin they earn (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Average Annual Consumption and Prices in Europe: 2010-2030 
  
Successive 
market 
power 
Double 
Marginalization 
Upstream 
Oligopoly 
Perfect 
Competition 
Russian gas export 
to Europe (bcm/y) 
NS is built 134 141 192 248 
NS is not built 126 133 177 204 
Consumption in 
Europe (bcm/y) 
NS is built 569 575 674 754 
NS is not built 567 572 663 710 
Gazprom’s market 
share in Europe 
NS is built 24% 24% 28% 33% 
NS is not built 22% 23% 27% 29% 
Averagea border 
prices (US$/tcm) 
NS is built 416 414 491 357 
NS is not built 427 420 510 434 
Averagea final 
prices (US$/tcm) 
NS is built 674 669 503 374 
NS is not built 680 673 523 448 
Note: a quantity-weighted; NS – Nord Stream 
 
                                                        
27 The reported transit fees through Ukraine and Belarus are averages (quantity-weighted). 
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Lower gas demand reduces the utilization of the Nord Stream system (see Table 5) and therefore 
Gazprom has to pay cost for unused transport capacity of the Nord Stream system.28 This cost is 
reflected in higher per unit transport cost of Gazprom’s gas exports when Nord Stream is built 
(Table 3: US$ 89.1/tcm) compared to the case when the pipeline is not built (Table 3: US$ 
87.7/tcm). Nevertheless, Nord Stream investment allows Gazprom to expand its sales in Europe 
(Table 4: “Gazprom’s market share in Europe” – 24% vs. 23%); thus, higher revenue from larger 
market share offsets Gazprom’s increased total transport cost and thus the value of Nord Stream 
investment is still positive, however, marginal. 
Under the upstream oligopoly case (only producers exercise market power), investment in 
Nord Stream also brings positive value to Gazprom (US$ 2.6 bn/y). This is primarily due to overall 
transport cost savings (Table 3) and Gazprom’s expansion of sales in Europe (Table 4). In this 
market power scenario, utilization of the Nord Stream system is maximized (Table 5) because gas 
demand is higher due to perfect competition among traders. 
 
Table 5: Transportation through the Nord Stream system (bcm) 
 
Successive 
market power 
Double 
Marginalization 
Upstream 
Oligopoly 
Perfect 
Competition 
Nord Stream's 
Capacity 
2011 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 
2015 40.8 31.6 55.0 55.0 55.0 
2020 48.0 40.2 55.0 55.0 55.0 
2025 51.3 44.3 55.0 55.0 55.0 
2030 55.0 52.5 55.0 55.0 55.0 
Average 
Utilization rate 
(2011-2030) 88% 76% 100% 100% 
  
Finally, in the case of perfect competition, investment in Nord Stream negatively impacts 
Gazprom’s profits (US$ -4.3 bn/y) because of non-strategic behaviour by producers who see 
border prices as fixed and sell gas until the marginal cost equals the border price. Thus, by having 
invested in Nord Stream, Gazprom exports more gas than it would have otherwise  (Table 4) and 
so border prices decrease (because of inverse demand functions) and so does its profitability. In a 
sense, under perfect competition, not investing in Nord Stream would have the inadvertent effect 
of an oligopolistic-like restriction of supply, which would increase Gazprom’s profits relative to 
the Nord Stream case. 
As one would expect, Nord Stream has a negative impact on the profits of transit countries in 
all market power scenarios. Compared to the Ukrainian route and the Northern Light pipeline 
                                                        
28 Cost of unused transport capacity of the Nord Stream system is calculated as the product of unit transport cost 
through the system (as reported in Appendix C: Table C.9) and the difference between Nord Stream’s capacity and its 
actual usage (see Table 2.5). 
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system, the Nord Stream pipeline is a cheaper option for carrying Russian gas to Western 
European markets (Figure 7). This is the major economic reason why Gazprom diverts gas away 
from the Ukrainian transit system and from the Belarusian Northern Light system, and 
consequently reduces their profits. However, in the perfect competition scenario there is no 
impact from Nord Stream on transit flows (and consequently profits) through Ukraine and 
Belarus because, in this scenario, demand in Europe is substantially higher due to marginal cost 
pricing by producers and traders. Thus, the Nord Stream project provides additional net export 
capacity to Europe. 
 
 
5.2.3. Impact on Traders, other Producers and Consumers 
In general, it is found that Nord Stream has a negative impact on the profitability of all other 
producers supplying gas to European markets (see Table 6). With a cheaper transport option 
(Nord Stream), Russian gas gains a greater market share than if there was “no” Nord Stream (see 
Table 4), and consequently the market share and profit of all other producers fall.  
By definition, traders’ total economic profits are zero when they behave competitively 
(perfect competition and upstream oligopoly scenarios). Traders’ profits are strictly positive only 
when they can modify final and border prices (and consequently their profits) by strategically 
“withholding” sales to consumers (successive market power and double marginalization 
scenarios).  In this scenario, Nord Stream investment positively affects the profitability of all 
traders (Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Annualized Profit of all Traders and other Producers (US$ bn/year)29 
      
All 
Traders 
All Other 
Producers 
Consumer 
Surplus 
Successive 
market power 
 
Nord Stream is built [1] 135.2 125.0 266.7 
Nord Stream is not built [2] 132.7 131.6 263.3 
Changes [3]=[1]-[2] 2.5 -6.5 3.4 
Double 
Marginalization 
Nord Stream is built [4] 135.9 124.3 269.9 
Nord Stream is not built [5] 133.6 128.5 267.2 
Changes [6]=[4]-[5] 2.3 -4.1 2.7 
Upstream 
Oligopoly 
Nord Stream is built [7] 0.0 171.6 372.5 
Nord Stream is not built [8] 0.0 180.9 361.3 
Changes [9]=[7]-[8] 0.0 -9.3 11.2 
Perfect 
Competition 
Nord Stream is built [10] 0.0 126.5 472.2 
Nord Stream is not built [11] 0.0 166.4 417.3 
Changes [12]=[10]-[12] 0.0 -40.0 54.9 
                                                        
29 The annualized profits were calculated at a 10% discount rate over the period of 25 years. 
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Table 6 shows that consumers benefit from investment in Nord Stream in all market power 
scenarios. Further, the higher the competition among producers and traders, the higher is the 
benefit of Nord Stream to European consumers. In a perfectly competitive “gas world”, the benefit 
of Nord Stream to consumers is almost three times higher than in a scenario where producers 
behave imperfectly (upstream oligopoly). In the case of double marginalization, the benefits of 
Nord Stream to consumers are quite limited (the benefits are US$ 2.7 bn/year) compared to the 
other market power scenarios. 
 
5.2.4. Impact on Overall Market Efficiency 
The basic criterion used to evaluate the Nord Stream investment is the change in market 
efficiency or social welfare, ∆SW, defined as: 
 
                (76) 
                                                              
                  
(77) 
 
where SWNS is the social welfare when Nord Stream is built and SWNo NS is the social welfare if the 
Nord Stream system is not built.  
 
Table 7 summarizes the annualized changes in profits and welfare (∆SW) resulting from 
investment in Nord Stream relative to the scenario of “no” Nord Stream investment. The 
annualized changes were calculated at a 10% discount rate over the next 25 years.  
 
Table 7: Annualized Net Gains (Losses) Resulting from Investment in Nord Stream (US$ bn/year) 
  
Successive 
market power 
Double 
Marginalization 
Upstream 
Oligopoly 
Perfect 
Competition 
Gazprom’s Profit 2.7 0.3 2.6 -4.3 
Profit of transit countries -2.1 -0.5 -0.7 0.0 
Profit of all other 
Producers -6.5 -4.1 -9.3 -40.0 
Profit of all Traders 2.5 2.3 0.0 0.0 
Consumer Surplus 3.4 2.7 11.2 54.9 
Social Welfare 0.01 0.7 3.8 10.6 
 
As can be seen from Table 7, impact of Nord Stream investment on social welfare is positive 
in all market power scenarios. There are almost no changes (US$ 0.01 bn/y) in market efficiency 
when producers, traders and transit countries exert market power (the successive market power 
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case). Thus, under this market power scenario, investment in the Nord Stream project only re-
distributes profits among market participants. In all other market scenarios, investment in the 
Nord Stream project improves overall market efficiency. Moreover, the higher the competition 
between market participants along the supply chain, the larger is the benefit of Nord Stream 
investment to market efficiency.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper the mathematical formulation of the equilibrium gas simulation model was 
presented. This model is different from previous gas models in its detailed presentation of the FSU 
gas sector. The inclusion of details of the FSU gas sector in the large-scale gas simulation model 
was mainly motivated by the analysis of policy questions related to the anticipated structural 
changes in gas exports from the FSU region to the European markets (such as route diversification 
by Russia), and the possible impact of these changes on European gas markets and participants. 
The model was demonstrated by analysing a Base Case scenario of European gas market 
development (2010-2030) in which only producers may exert market power while all other 
market participants are assumed to be price-takers. In the Base Case scenario it was also assumed 
that Russia’s bypass projects, Nord Stream and South Stream, would be built according to 
Gazprom’s plan. Findings from the Base Case scenario suggest, among other things, that in light of 
the decline in indigenous gas production in Europe, the role of Russian gas is still important but 
quite limited (between 2010 and 2030 the market share of Russian gas increases modestly from 
26% to 32%), and that Europe’s growing import requirements are increasingly met with LNG 
imports (the market share of LNG expands from 26% in 2010 to 34% in 2030). This result is in 
line with the findings of Holz et al. (2009). We also found that once the Nord Stream and South 
Stream pipelines become operational, the role of transit countries, especially Ukraine, in 
transporting Russian gas to Europe becomes rather marginal. However, gas flows through the 
Yamal-Europe pipeline (Belarus) are not affected by these two pipelines. 
The model’s capability was also shown by carrying out an analysis of investment in Nord 
Stream and its implications for profits for individual market parties, as well as for overall market 
efficiency. It was found that investment in Nord Stream is unattractive to its investors only when 
all market participants are price-takers (which does not conform with current market realities), 
whereas under market power scenarios Nord Stream appears to be an economically attractive 
project to its investors (Gazprom and European energy companies). We also found that 
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investment in the Nord Stream project is rather sensitive to the assumption regarding the level of 
downstream competition in European markets.  
As was shown in the results section, the economics of Nord Stream are mainly driven by: (i) 
lower total transport costs from different production regions in Russia to final consuming markets 
in Europe compared to the Ukrainian route and the Northern Light system (Belarus), (ii) the 
changing geography of gas production in Russia which also modifies Gazprom’s transport cost 
structure in favour of the Nord Stream route, and (iii) the possible exercising of market power by 
transit countries (Ukraine and Belarus). 
Without a detailed representation of the FSU gas “region” in this model it would not be 
possible to see that Nord Stream can be an economically profitable project on its own (at least in 
our oligopoly simulations), without strategic bargaining considerations found by Hubert and 
Ikonnikova (2003), Hubert and Ikonnikova (2004) and Hubert and Suleymanova (2008). Using 
the large-scale gas simulation model, we were able to analyse the Nord Stream project in terms of 
market efficiency and social welfare. Here, it was found that Nord Stream improves market 
efficiency in all market power scenarios, and that the higher the degree of competition between 
market participants, the more European consumers gain. 
The validation of the model with historical data shows that in general the model’s results are 
in line with actual market outcomes for the years 2008 and 2009, and that the behaviour of the 
model is consistent with economic intuition. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis shows that the 
model’s results are fairly robust in terms of major structural assumptions.  
This model can be used for the analysis of other policy questions concerning the regional gas 
trade in Europe and CIS (including Central Asia). For example, in (Chyong et al., 2010; Chyong, 
forthcoming) this model was used to analyse the economic value of Gazprom’s investment in the 
Nord Stream and South Stream pipeline projects under different assumptions about market 
development, transit pricing policy and transit disruption scenarios.  
Further model enhancements are desirable. First, inter-seasonal gas storage should be 
included in the model (e.g., as in (Egging et al., 2008; Lise and Hobbs, 2008)). The inclusion of 
inter-seasonal gas storage in the model might refine the results concerning Nord Stream 
investment. One of the advantages of using the Ukrainian route compared to Gazprom’s existing 
and new routes is cheap access to large underground storage areas in Ukraine. Therefore, once 
gas storage areas are accounted for, one might find that total transport and storage costs along the 
Ukrainian route are lower than those costs along Gazprom’s existing or new export routes - such 
as Nord Stream. Also, having gas storage areas in the model would enable a more detailed analysis 
of transit disruption scenarios. Secondly, geographical coverage of the model could be expanded 
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from regional to global (e.g., as in (Egging et al., 2009)), as well as representing the demand sector 
in greater detail (e.g., gas demand divided by sectors and regions instead of representing each 
country with one demand function). Regional gas markets have become more interconnected 
recently through increased gas trading in its liquefied form. Therefore, having a global gas model 
would, of course, refine the results presented above. Moreover, this will allow us to address 
important questions concerning the globalization of the natural gas trade and energy security on 
both regional (particularly Europe, CIS and Asia) and global scales. Additionally, the model could 
be elaborated so that it can endogenously expand capacity (such as pipeline and LNG terminal 
capacity) (e.g., (Lise and Hobbs, 2008; Egging et al. 2009)). This would allow analysis of questions 
concerning optimal investment in gas infrastructure. Moreover, this would allow analysis of the 
cost efficiency of Nord Stream investment both in terms of alternative capacities and routes. 
Further, probabilistic elements could also be included in the model (e.g., (Zhuang and Gabriel, 
2008; Gabriel et al., 2009)). For example, this would allow inclusion of uncertainty in demand 
growth.  Exogenous probabilities of gas flow disruptions through transit countries could also be 
specified and then, given that risk, the model can then determine the optimal reaction of market 
players in terms of investment in capacity expansion (such as storage, “bypass” pipelines and LNG 
terminals), sales and production. 
 
  
 
 
Page 50 of 107 
REFERENCES 
 
Anders, T., Johnson, P. E. & Ram-Wallooppillai, P. E. 2006. The Art and Science of Designing a 
Greenfield Pipeline. Pipeline Simulation Interest Group [Online]. Available: 
http://www.psig.org/Papers/papers.asp [Accessed December 01, 2009]. 
Arthur D. Little 2008. West European Gas Transmission Tariff Comparisons. Report to Gas 
Transport Services. 
Barinov, A. E. 2007. Systemic and Political Factors Affecting Cost Overrun in the World Economy’s 
Large Investment Projects. Studies on Russian Economic Development, 18 (6), 8. 
BASF. 2007. Debt Issuance Programme Prospectus. Available: 
http://www.basf.com/group/corporate/de/function/conversions:/publish/content/inves
tor-relations/bonds-and-credit-rating/images/BASF_DIP_e.pdf [Accessed 9 June 2010]. 
BASF. 2009. BASF Report 2009 - Economic, environmental and social performance. Available: 
http://www.basf.com/group/corporate/en/function/conversions:/publish/content/about
-basf/facts-reports/reports/2009/BASF_Report_2009.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2010]. 
BASF. 2010a. BASF - We earn a premium on our cost of capital [Online]. Available: 
http://www.basf.com/group/corporate/en/investor-relations/strategy/cost-of-
capital/index [Accessed 9 June 2010]. 
BASF. 2010b. Natural Gas Trading [Online]. Available: 
http://report.basf.com/2009/en/managementsanalysis/segments/oilgas/naturalgastradi
ng.html [Accessed 21 June 2010]. 
Bernotat, W. 2010. E.ON - 2009 Full Year Results. presentation [Online]. Available: 
http://www.eon.com/en/downloads/E.ON_Charts_Bernotat_IR.pdf [Accessed 9 April 
2010]. 
Bettzuege, M. O., Lochner, S. & Dieckhӧner, C. 2010. Model-based Analysis of Infrastructure 
Projects and Market Integration in Europe with Special Focus on Security of Supply 
Scenarios. Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne Presentation [Online]. 
Available: http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_CONSULT/CLOSED%20PUBLIC%20C
ONSULTATIONS/GAS/E09-PC-
37/Tab2/Results%20of%20ERGEG's%20consultancy%20study [Accessed June 06, 2010]. 
Bolle, F. & Ruban, R. 2007. Competition and Security of Supply: Let Russia Buy into the European 
Gas Market! European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business 
Administration and Economics, Discussion Paper No. 258. 
 
 
Page 51 of 107 
Boots, M. G., Rijkers, F. A. M. & Hobbs, B. F. 2004. Trading in the Downstream European  Gas 
Market: A Successive Oligopoly Approach. The Energy Journal, 25 (3), 73-102. 
BP. 2010a. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010. Available: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_p
ublications/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2010_downloads/stati
stical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2010.pdf [Accessed July 2010]. 
BP. 2010b. South Caucasus Pipeline [Online]. Available: 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9006670&contentId=7015095 
[Accessed July 2010]. 
California Energy Commission. 2003. Natural Gas Market Assessment. Available: 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/2003-08-08_100-03-006.PDF [Accessed July 2010]. 
CBR. 2010. Official exchange rate of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation [Online]. Available: 
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/daily.aspx [Accessed 23 August 2010]. 
CFE. 2010. Corporate Income Tax in Germany [Online]. Available: http://www.cfe-
eutax.org/taxation/corporate-income-tax/germany [Accessed 21 June 2010]. 
Chollet, A., Meinhart, B., Hirschhausen, C. V. & Opitz, P. 2000. Options for transporting Russian Gas 
to Western Europe – A Game-theoretic Simulation Analysis. DIW Discussion Papers, # 261. 
Chyong, C. K. forthcoming. The Economics of the South Stream pipeline in the context of Russo-
Ukrainian gas bargaining. EPRG Working Paper series. Cambridge, UK. 
Chyong, C. K., Noёl, P. & Reiner, D. M. 2010. The Economics of the Nord Stream Pipeline System. 
EPRG Working Paper series [Online]. Available: http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/ChyongNoelReinerCombinedEPRG10263.pdf [Accessed 
September 2010]. 
Coyle, D. A. & Patel, V. 2009. Processes and pump services in the LNG industry. Available: 
http://staff.ui.ac.id/internal/131803508/material/LNG-Process.pdf [Accessed July 2010]. 
Cremer, H., Gasmi, F. & Laffont, J.-J. 2003. Access to pipelines in competitive gas market. Journal of 
Regulatory Economics, 24 (1), 5-33. 
Day, C. J., Hobbs, B. F. & Pang, J. S. 2002. Oligopolistic competition in power networks: a 
conjectured supply function approach. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 17 (3), 597–
607. 
De Wolf, D. & Smeers, Y. 1996. Optimal dimensioning of pipe networks with application to gas 
transmission networks. Operations Research, 44 (4), 596-608. 
 
 
Page 52 of 107 
DEA. 2010. Denmark’s Oil and Gas Production 2009. Available: 
http://www.ens.dk/Documents/Netboghandel%20-
%20publikationer/2010/Denmarks_oil_and_gas_production.pdf [Accessed August 2010]. 
Desertec. 2010. Pipeline/LNG Comparative Costs [Online]. Available: http://www.desertec-
asia.com/content/pl-comparative-costs.html [Accessed July 2010]. 
Dockner, E. J. 1992. A Dynamic Theory of Conjectural Variations. The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 40 (4), 377-395. 
E.ON. 2010. Nord Stream Pipeline [Online]. Available: 
http://www.eon.com/en/businessareas/35301.jsp [Accessed 21 June 2010]. 
EC 2006. Green paper: A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy. 
COM(2006) 105 final,. Brussels. 
EC 2008a. EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan: 2nd Strategic Energy Review. 
MEMO/08/703. Brussels. 
EC 2008b. European energy and transport: Trends to 2030 - Update 2007. DG TREN,. 
EC. 2009a. Antitrust: Commission accepts commitments by GDF Suez to boost competition in French 
gas market [Online]. Brussels. Available: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1872&format=HTML&a
ged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [Accessed July 2010]. 
EC. 2009b. Antitrust: Commission welcomes E.ON proposals to increase competition in German gas 
market [Online]. Brussels. Available: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/567&format=HTM
L&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [Accessed July 2010]. 
EC. 2010. Commission welcomes ENI's structural remedies proposal to increase competition in the 
Italian gas market [Online]. Brussels. Available: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/19&format=HTM
L&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [Accessed July 2010]. 
ECT 2006. Gas Transit Tariffs in selected Energy Charter Treaty Countries. Brussels: Energy 
Charter Secretariat. 
EDF. 2010. GAZPROM, ENI et EDF signent un accord de partenariat sur le projet South Stream 
[Online]. Available: http://medias.edf.com/communiques-de-presse/tous-les-
communiques-de-presse/communique-2010/gazprom-eni-et-edf-signent-un-accord-de-
partenariat-sur-le-projet-south-stream-80823.html [Accessed 21 June 2010]. 
Egging, R., Gabriel, S. A., Holz, F. & Zhuang, J. 2008. A Complementarity Model for the European 
Natural Gas Market. Energy Policy, 36 (7), 2385-2414. 
 
 
Page 53 of 107 
Egging, R., Holz, F. & Gabriel, S. 2009. The World Gas Model -  A Multi-Period Mixed 
Complementarity Model for the Global Natural Gas Market 2009. DIW Discussion Paper 959 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.345060.de/dp959.pdf. 
Egging, R. G. & Gabriel, S. A. 2006. Examining market power in the European natural gas market. 
Energy Policy, 34 (17), 2762–2778. 
EIA. 2003. The Global Liquefied Natural Gas Market: Status and Outlook. Available: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/global/pdf/eia_0637.pdf [Accessed July 
2010]. 
EIA. 2010. Analysis of Natural Gas Imports/Exports & Pipelines [Online]. US Energy Information 
Administration. Available: http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pub_analysis_move.asp 
[Accessed September 2010]. 
ENI. 2007. Eni and Gazprom sign the agreement for the South Stream Project [Online]. Available: 
http://www.eni.com/en_IT/media/press-
releases/2007/06/Eni_and_Gazprom_sign_the_agree_23.06.2007.shtml [Accessed 21 June 
2010]. 
ENTSOG. 2010. The European Natural Gas Network (Capacities at cross-border points on the 
primary market) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.entsog.eu/download/maps_data/ENTSOG_CAP_June2010.pdf [Accessed 25 
July 2010 2010]. 
Eurostat. 2010. Energy Statistics - prices [Online]. Available: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/energy/data/main_tables [Accessed 
July 2010]. 
Friedman, J. W. 1983. Oligopoly Theory, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. 
Frunze. 2010. NPO izgotovilo oborudovanie dlya SEG (in Russian) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.frunze.com.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=267:2010-
02-03-06-21-09&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=118 [Accessed 21 April 2010]. 
FTS. 2010. Tarify na uslugi po transportirovke gaza po magistralnym gazoprovodam OAO 
"Gazprom", vkhodyashie v Edinuyu sistemu gazosnabzhenia, dlya nezavisimikh organizasiy 
(in Russian). Available: 
http://www.fstrf.ru/tariffs/info_tarif/gas/1/Prikaz_Federalynoj_sluzhby_po_tarifam_ot_18
_dekabrya_2009_g._N_441-e_3.doc [Accessed 23 August 2010]. 
 
 
Page 54 of 107 
Gabriel, S. & Smeers, Y. 2005. Complementarity Problems in Restructured Natural Gas Markets. 
CORE Discussion Paper Series [Online]. Available: 
http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/services/psfiles/dp05/dp2005_37.pdf [Accessed July 2010]. 
Gabriel, S. A., Kiet, S. & Zhuang, J. 2005a. A mixed complementarity-based equilibrium model of 
natural gas markets. Operations Research, 53 (5), 799-818. 
Gabriel, S. A., Manik, J. & Vikas, S. 2003. Computational experience with a large-scale, multi-period, 
spatial equilibrium model of the North American natural gas system. Networks and Spatial 
Economics, 3, 97-122. 
Gabriel, S. A., Zhuang, J. & Egging, R. 2009. Solving stochastic complementarity problems in energy 
market modeling using scenario reduction. European Journal of Operational Research, 197 
(3), 1028-1040. 
Gabriel, S. A., Zhuang, J. & Kiet, S. 2005b. A large-scale linear complementarity model of the North 
American natural gas market. Energy Economics, 27 (4), 639– 665. 
Galsi. 2010. Technical Data [Online]. Available: http://www.galsi.it/costruzione-gasdotto-marino-
Algeria-Sardegna-Toscana/Technical-data/index.php/id_menu-44 [Accessed August 
2010]. 
Gas Strategies. 2007. LNG Data service. Available: http://www.gasstrategies.com/information-
services/lng-data-service/intro [Accessed 11 December 2008]. 
Gasunie 2010. Annual Report 2009. 
Gazprom. 2005. BOARD OF DIRECTORS REVIEWS PRELIMINARY OPERATING HIGHLIGHTS OVER 
2005 AND MAJOR DRAFT FINANCIAL DOCUMENTS FOR 2006 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2005/november/article63315/ [Accessed 5 June 
2010]. 
Gazprom. 2008. Gas Export. Export Routes and Supplied Products Diversification [Online]. Moscow: 
Gazprom. Available: 
http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/34/666182/presentation_18.06.2008-eng.pdf 
[Accessed May 2010]. 
Gazprom. 2010a. Gazprom's Databook 2009 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/05/285743/2010_04_28_gazprom_databook_1.xls 
[Accessed June 21 2010]. 
Gazprom. 2010b. Marketing - Europe [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gazprom.com/marketing/europe/ [Accessed September 2010]. 
 
 
Page 55 of 107 
Gazprom. 2010c. Nord Stream [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gazprom.com/production/projects/pipelines/nord-stream/ [Accessed June 
2010]. 
Gazprom. 2010d. Protocol on contributions by Beltransgaz to Belarusian Innovation Fund and 
Addendum to gas supply and transit contract signed [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2010/july/article100656/ [Accessed August 
2010]. 
Gazprom. 2010e. South Stream – Guarantee of Europe’s Future Energy Security [Online]. Available: 
http://south-stream.info/fileadmin/pixs/bukleti/presentation_spb_en.pdf [Accessed 
September 2010]. 
Gazprom. 2010f. Summary - Portovaya compressor station. Available: 
http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/86/569604/portovaya_eng.pdf [Accessed 17 May 
2010]. 
GDF SUEZ. 2010. Press Releases - "GDF SUEZ delivers solid results in the first half and confirms 
targets" [Online]. Available: http://www.gdfsuez.com/en/news/press-releases/press-
releases/?communique_id=1298 [Accessed 11 August 2010]. 
Golombek, R. & Gjelsvik, E. 1995. Effects of Liberalizing the Natural Gas Markets in Western 
Europe. The Energy Journal, 16 (1), 85-111. 
Golombek, R., Gjelsvik, E. & Rosendahl, K. E. 1998. Increased Competition on the Supply Side of the 
Western European Natural Gas Market. The Energy Journal, 19 (3), 1-18. 
Grais, W. & Zheng, K. 1996. Strategic Interdependence in European East-West Gas Trade: A 
Hierarchical Stackelberg Game Approach. The Energy Journal, 17 (3), 61-84. 
Grivach, A. 2006. Vlada Rusakova: U nas gaz est [Online]. Available: 
http://www.vremya.ru/2006/190/8/163350.html [Accessed July 2010]. 
Hirschhausen, C. v., Meinhart, B. & Pavel, F. 2005. Transporting Russian Gas to Western Europe - A 
Simulation Analysis. The Energy Journal, 26 (2), 49-68. 
Hobbs, B. F. & Helman, U. 2004. Complementarity-based equilibrium modeling for electric power 
markets. In: Bunn, D. W. (ed.) Modelling Prices in Competitive Electricity Markets. John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd. 
Hobbs, B. F. & Rijkers, F. A. M. 2004. Strategic generation with conjectured transmission price 
responses in a mixed transmission pricing system—Part I: Formulation. IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems 19 (2), 707–717. 
 
 
Page 56 of 107 
Hobbs, B. F., Rijkers, F. A. M. & Wals, A. F. 2004. Strategic generation with conjectured 
transmission price responses in a mixed transmission pricing system—Part II: Application. 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 19 (2), 872–879. 
Holz, F. 2007. How Dominant is Russia on the European Natural Gas Market? Results from 
Modeling Exercises. Applied Economics Quarterly. 
Holz, F., Hirschhausen, C. v. & Kemfert, C. 2008. A strategic model of European gas supply 
(GASMOD). Energy Economics, 30 (3), 766-788. 
Holz, F., Hirschhausen, C. V. & Kemfert, C. 2009. Perspectives of the European Natural Gas Markets 
Until 2025. The Energy Journal, 30 (Special Issue: World Natural Gas Markets And Trade: A 
Multi-Modelling Perspective.), 137-150. 
Hubert, F. & Ikonnikova, S. 2003. Strategic investment and bargaining power in supply chains: A 
Shapley value analysis of the Eurasian gas market. Humboldt University Berlin. 
Hubert, F. & Ikonnikova, S. 2004. Hold-Up, Multilateral Bargaining, and Strategic Investment: The 
Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas. Available: http://www2.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de/institute/hns/publications/Hold-up-Multilateral-Bargaining.pdf [Accessed July 
2010]. 
Hubert, F. & Ikonnikova, S. 2009. Investment Options and Bargaining Power in the Eurasian 
Supply Chain for Natural Gas. Journal of Industrial Economics (forthcoming). 
Hubert, F. & Suleymanova, I. 2008. Strategic Investment in International Gas Transport Systems: A 
Dynamic Analysis of the Hold-up Problem DIW Discussion Papers. 
IEA. 2003. World Energy Investment Outlook - Outlook for European Gas Demand, Supply and 
Investment to 2030. Available: 
http://www.iea.org/work/2004/investment/outlook%20for%20European%20gas%20de
mand.pdf [Accessed May 2010]. 
IEA 2005. World Energy Outlook 2005 - Middle East and North Africa Insights. Paris: 
OECD/International Energy Agency. 
IEA 2009. World Energy Outlook 2009. Paris: OECD/International Energy Agency. 
IEA 2010. Natural Gas Information. Paris: OECD/International Energy Agency. 
IFC. 2010a. Doing Business: Bulgaria [Online]. Available: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Data/ExploreEconomies/Bulgaria/paying-taxes [Accessed 
September 2010]. 
IFC. 2010b. Doing Business: Greece [Online]. Available: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Data/ExploreEconomies/Greece/paying-taxes [Accessed 
September 2010]. 
 
 
Page 57 of 107 
IFC. 2010c. Doing Business: Hungary [Online]. Available: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Data/ExploreEconomies/Hungary/paying-taxes [Accessed 
September 2010]. 
IFC. 2010d. Doing Business: Serbia [Online]. Available: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Data/ExploreEconomies/Serbia/paying-taxes [Accessed 
September 2010]. 
IFC. 2010e. Doing Business: Slovenia [Online]. Available: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Data/ExploreEconomies/Slovenia/paying-taxes [Accessed 
September 2010]. 
Korchemkin, M. 2010. Nord Stream: Russian land section nearly three times more expensive than 
German OPAL [Online]. Available: http://www.eegas.com/pipecost2010-05e.htm 
[Accessed 5 June 2010]. 
Kőrösi, T. 2006. Liberalization of Hungarian of Gas Market (presentation). Available: 
http://www.unece.org/energy/se/pdfs/wpgas/session/16_session/Hungary_ENSZ%20ea
%20060126.pdf [Accessed July 2010]. 
Korotkov, A. 2009. Evropa zhdet dopolnitelnih ob'emov prirodnogo gaza (in Russian). Zerkalo 
[Online]. Available: http://old.zerkalo.az/rubric.php?id=39057&dd=22&mo=1&yr=2009 
[Accessed July 2010]. 
Kovacevic, A. 2009. The Impact of the Russia–Ukraine Gas Crisis in South Eastern Europe. Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies Working Papers. Oxford, UK. 
KPMG. 2009. KPMG in the Czech Republic - Tax Card 2009. Available: 
http://www.kpmg.cz/czech/images/but/0903_Tax-Card.pdf [Accessed 25 March 2010]. 
Krey, V. & Minullin, Y. 2010. Modelling competition between natural gas pipeline projects to China. 
International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, 10 (1/2), 143-171. 
Lise, W. & Hobbs, B. F. 2008. Future evolution of the liberalised European gas market: Simulation 
results with a dynamic model. Energy, 33 (7), 989-1004. 
Lise, W., Hobbs, B. F. & Oostvoorn, F. v. 2008. Natural gas corridors between the EU and its main 
suppliers: Simulation results with the dynamic GASTALE model. Energy Policy, 36 (6), 
1890-1906. 
LNG OneWorld. 2010. LNG Market Summary: August 2010 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.lngoneworld.com/lngv1.nsf/portal/index.html [Accessed August 2010]. 
Lochner, S. & Bothe, D. 2007. From Russia with Gas: An analysis of the Nord Stream pipeline’s 
impact on the European Gas Transmission System with the Tiger-Model. EWI Working 
 
 
Page 58 of 107 
Paper, No. 07.02. Cologne, Germany: Institute of Energy Economics at the University of 
Cologne. 
Lochner, S. & Dieckhöner, C. 2010. Tiger: Infrastructure and Dispatch Model of the European Gas 
Market. Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne. Cologne. 
Lochner, S. & Lindenberger, D. 2009. Analysis of the Impact of the Nord Stream Pipeline’s Onshore 
Connections on the Natural Gas Pipeline Transmission Grids in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne. 
Lyutyagin, D. 2010. Gazprom: Rossiyskiy gaz provit slantsevogo (in Russian). Veles Capital 
Analytical Review. Moscow. 
MAN Diesel A/S. 2010. LNG Carriers with ME-GI Engine and High Pressure Gas Supply System. 
Available: http://www.mandieselturbo.com/files/news/filesof8121/5510-0026-
00ppr.indd.pdf [Accessed August 2010]. 
Mangham, C. 2009. Nord Stream financing to sign in December-bankers. Reuters News Agency 
[Online]. Available: http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKGEE5AM2BP20091123 [Accessed 
18 January 2010]. 
Mathiesen, L., Roland, K. & Thonstad, K. 1987. The European natural gas market: Degrees of 
market power on the selling side. In: Golombek, R., Hoel, M. & Vislie, J. (eds.) Natural Gas 
Markets and Contracts. North-Holland. 
Medgaz. 2010. Technical Summary [Online]. Available: 
http://www.medgaz.com/medgaz/pages/datos_significativos-eng.htm [Accessed August 
2010]. 
Midthun, K. T., Bjørndal, M. & Tomasgard, A. 2009. Modeling Optimal Economic Dispatch and 
System Effects in Natural Gas Networks. The Energy Journal, 30 (4), 155-180. 
Morbee, J. & Proost, S. 2008. Russian market power on the EU gas market: can Gazprom do the 
same as in Ukraine? Catholic University of Leuven, Center for Economic Studies, Discussions 
Paper Series (DPS) 08.02. 
Müller-Studer, L. 2009. Zug : doing business. Economic Promotion Zug [Online]. Available: 
http://www.zug.ch/behoerden/volkswirtschaftsdirektion/economic-promotion/faq-
frequently-asked-questions/economy-
18/resolveUid/496a182660bcfa6da3ab6c73e76a3f89/at_download/file [Accessed 2010]. 
Myerson, R. B. 1991. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass.::Harvard University 
Press. 
Naftogaz of Ukraine. 2010. Proektni parametry ta faktychni obsyagy transportuvanya prirodnogo 
gazu gazotransportnoyu systemou Ukrainy: 2008 and 2009 (In Ukrainian) [Online]. 
 
 
Page 59 of 107 
Available: 
http://www.naftogaz.com/www/2/nakweb.nsf/0/0DF906D861E53FC7C22573FE003F3D
66/$file/GTSUkraine.gif [Accessed 21 April 2010]. 
Nash, J. F. 1953. Two-Person Cooperative Games. Econometrica, 21 (1), 128-140. 
Nazarova, Y. 2009. "Gazprom" menyaet orientatsiu. РБК daily [Online]. Available: 
http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2009/09/14/tek/430898 [Accessed 5 November 2009]. 
Nazarova, Y. 2010. Truboprovodchik "Gazprom". РБК daily [Online]. Available: 
http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2010/01/27/tek/454812 [Accessed 23 March 2010]. 
Neftegaz. 2010. Nord Stream pipeline costs will be more expensive than predicted [Online]. 
Available: http://www.neftegaz.ru/en/news/view/93646/ [Accessed 4 February 2010]. 
NEL. 2010. NEL in Zahlen (in German) [Online]. Available: http://www.nel-
pipeline.de/public/nel/projekt/opal-in-zahlen.html [Accessed 15 June 2010]. 
NET4GAS. 2010. Project GAZELLE [Online]. Available: http://www.net4gas.cz/en/projekt-gazela/ 
[Accessed 15 June 2010]. 
Newbery, D. 1994. Gazprom's Equity Stakes in Transit and Distribution Companies. Unpublished 
Work. University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics. 
Nord Stream AG. 2010a. Facts & Figures [Online]. Available: http://www.nord-
stream.com/en/the-pipeline/facts-figures.html [Accessed 15 June 2010]. 
Nord Stream AG. 2010b. Our Company [Online]. Available: http://www.nord-stream.com/en/our-
company.html [Accessed 21 June 2010]. 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance. 2010. The corporate tax system and taxation of capital income 
[Online]. Norwegian Ministry of Finance. Available: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/tema/norsk_okonomi/topics/The-corporate-tax-
system-and-taxation-of-capital-income.html?id=418058 [Accessed August 2010]. 
Noёl, P. 2008. Beyond dependence: How to deal with Russian gas. European Council on Foreign 
Relations. 
Noёl, P. 2009. A Market Between us: Reducing the Political Cost of Europe’s Dependence on 
Russian Gas. EPRG Working Paper  
NPD. 2010. Pipelines and onshore facilities [Online]. Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. Available: 
http://www.npd.no/en/Publications/Facts/Facts-2010/Chapter-15/ [Accessed July 
2010]. 
O’Neill, R. P., Williard, M., Wilkins, B. & Pike, R. 1979. A mathematical programming model for 
allocation of natural gas. Operations Research, 27 (5), 857-873. 
 
 
Page 60 of 107 
OME. 2001. Assessment of internal and external gas supply options for the EU - Evaluation of the 
supply costs of new natural gas supply projects to the EU and an investigation of related 
financial requirements and tools. Available: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/studies/doc/gas/2001_10_external_gas_suppl
y.pdf [Accessed 15 April 2010]. 
OPAL. 2010. The OPAL in figures [Online]. Available: http://www.opal-
pipeline.com/public/en/project/opal-in-figures.html [Accessed 15 June 2010]. 
Pirani, S. 2007. Ukraine's Gas Sector. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Working Paper. Oxford, UK. 
Pirani, S., Stern, J. & Yafimava, K. 2009. The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009: A 
Comprehensive Assessment. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Working Paper. Oxford, UK. 
Pirani, S., Stern, J. & Yafimava, K. 2010. The April 2010 Russo-Ukrainian gas agreement and its 
implications for Europe. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Working Paper. Oxford, UK. 
RWE. 2010a. RWE Group structure [Online]. Available: 
http://www.rwe.com/web/cms/en/111486/rwe/rwe-group/group-structure/ [Accessed 
4 February 2010]. 
RWE. 2010b. RWE Group`s Key Figures [Online]. Available: 
http://www.rwe.com/web/cms/en/113730/rwe/investor-relations/shares/rwe-groups-
key-figures/ [Accessed 5 June 2010 2010]. 
Ryabkova, D. 2010. Belarus proigrala Rossii "Gazovuyu voynu" iz-za Ukrainy? (in Russian) [Online]. 
Available: http://news.finance.ua/ru/~/2/0/all/2010/07/01/202247 [Accessed 21 July 
2010]. 
Sagen, E. L. & Tsygankova, M. 2008. Russian natural gas exports—Will Russian gas price reforms 
improve the European security of supply? Energy Policy, 36, 867-880. 
Sea Rates. 2010. Port to port distances [Online]. Available: http://www.searates.com/ [Accessed 
August 2010]. 
Shmatko, S. I. 2009. O proekte Energeticheskoy strategii Rossii na period do 2030 goda (in 
Russian). Available: http://minenergo.gov.ru/upload/docs/energostrategiya.ppt [Accessed 
July 2010]. 
Silve, F. & Noёl, P. 2010. Cost Curves for Gas Supply Security: The Case of Bulgaria. EPRG Working 
Paper Series [Online]. Available: http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/Silve_Noel_BulgariaGasSecurityCostCurves_Revised_100929_fs
2.pdf [Accessed September 2010]. 
Smeers, Y. 1997. Computable equilibrium models and the restructuring of the European electricity 
and gas markets. The Energy Journal, 18 (4), 1-31. 
 
 
Page 61 of 107 
Smeers, Y. 2008. Gas models and three difficult objectives. CORE DISCUSSION PAPER [Online]. 
Available: http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coreDP2008_9.pdf 
[Accessed January 2009]. 
Soderbergh, B. 2010. Production from gian gas fields in Norway and Russia and Subsequent 
Implications for European Energy Security. PhD, Uppsala University. 
Soderbergh, B., Jakobsson, K. & Aleklett, K. 2009. European energy security:The future of 
Norwegian natural gas production. Energy Policy, 37, 5037-5055. 
South Stream AG. 2010a. Gas Pipeline Route [Online]. Available: http://south-
stream.info/index.php?id=10&L=1 [Accessed May 2010]. 
South Stream AG. 2010b. South Stream: Cooperation - Italy [Online]. Available: http://south-
stream.info/index.php?id=16&L=1 [Accessed September 2010]. 
Spengler, J. J. 1950. Vertical integration and anti-trust policy. Journal of Political Economy, 58 (4), 
347-352. 
Tarr, D. & Thomson, P. 2004. The Merits of Dual Pricing of Russian Natural Gas. The World 
Economy, 27 (8), 1173-1194. 
Tirole, J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Massachusetts:The MIT Press. 
Ukrainska Pravda. 2009. Kontrakt pro tranzit Rossiyskogo gazu + Dodatkova ugoda pro avans 
"Gazpromu" (in Russian) [Online]. Available: 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/4b1aa355cac8c/ [Accessed 25 January 2009]. 
Ukrrudprom. 2010. NPO im. Frunze zavershaet otgruzku oborudovanya Gazpromu (in Russian) 
[Online]. Available: 
http://ukrrudprom.com/news/NPO_im_Frunze_izgotovilo_oborudovanie_dlya_Gazproma.
html [Accessed]. 
van Oostvoorn, F. (ed.) 2003. Long-term Gas Supply Security in an Enlarged Europe, Petten: ECN. 
Victor, N. M. & Victor, D. G. 2006. Bypassing Ukraine: Exporting Russian Gas to Poland and 
Germany. In: Victor, D. G., Jaffe, A. M. & Hayes, M. H. (eds.) Natural Gas and Geopolitics: From 
1970 to 2040. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Wintershall 2010. Nord Stream Eco-Efficiency Analysis. Kassel. 
World Bank. 2009. The Future of the Natural Gas Market in Southeast Europe. Available: 
http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9780821378649/1?zoomed=&zoomPerc
ent=&zoomX=&zoomY=&noteText=&noteX=&noteY=&viewMode=magazine [Accessed 23 
August 2010]. 
Yafimava, K. 2009. Belarus: the domestic gas market and relations with Russia. In: Pirani, S. (ed.) 
Russian and CIS Gas Markets and their Impact on Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
Page 62 of 107 
Yenikeyeff, S. M. 2008. Kazakhstan’s Gas: Export Markets and Export Routes. Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies Working Paper. Oxford, UK. 
Zak, M. 2006. Gazprom: otchetnost vnosit neznachitelnie korrektivy (in Russian). Veles Capital 
Analytical Review. Moscow. 
Zhuang, J. & Gabriel, S. A. 2008. A complementarity model for solving stochastic natural gas 
market equilibria. Energy Economics, 30 (1), 113-147. 
Zwart, G. & Mulder, M. 2006. NATGAS: A model of the European natural gas market. CPB 
Memorandum 144. 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 63 of 107 
APPENDIX A.  Modelling vertically integrated companies 
Suppose that a vertically integrated company has two subsidiary companies responsible for 
gas production (q) and gas sales (s). The aim is to show that modelling these two companies 
separately is equivalent to modelling the vertically integrated company as a single problem, 
provided that the relationships between subsidiary companies are competitive. Let us consider 
the case of vertically integrated company as follows: 
 
   
     
            (A.1) 
subject to  
           (A.2) 
                 (A.3) 
 
where πI is the profit of the vertically integrated company, c>0 – unit production cost, Q – 
production capacity, p(s) is the inverse demand function of the following form p=b-as. 
 
Then, the KKT conditions for (A1) are 
      
  
  
      
(A.4) 
             (A.5) 
            (A.6) 
          (A.7) 
 
If s, q>0 and q<Q, then it is easy to show that the solution to (A.4-A.7) is 
 
      
   
  
 
(A.8) 
 
and the total profit of the integrated company is 
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)   
   
  
 
      
  
 
(A.9) 
 
However, if q>Q, that is production constraint (A.2) is binding, then the solution to (A.4-A.7) is 
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        (A.10) 
and  
 
                        (A.11) 
 
Now consider two separate problems – one for sales: 
 
   
   
    [       ] (A.12) 
 
and one for production: 
 
   
   
    [    ] (A.13) 
subject to  
           (A.14) 
 
where πs is the profit from sales, πp is the profit from production, and p* is the wellhead price, 
which is determined by market clearing condition (A.15): 
 
                  (A.15) 
 
Below are the KKT conditions for (A.12) : 
 
      
  
  
       
(A.16) 
 
and for (A.13): 
 
             (A.17) 
            (A.18) 
 
If s, q>0 and q<Q, then the solution to (A.16-A.18) is 
 
      
    
  
 
(A.19) 
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     (A.20) 
and total profit is 
 
         
    
  
(   
    
  
   )  
    
  
       
      
  
 
(A.21) 
 
 
In case q>Q, that is (A.14) is binding, the solution to (A.16-A.18) is 
 
        (A.22) 
         (A.23) 
 
and the profit of the integrated company is 
 
                                      (A.24) 
 
Since the resultant profits are identical, that is (A.21)=(A.9) and (A.24)=(A.11), modelling the 
separate activities of an integrated company as being price-taking (competitive) with respect to 
each other yields  the same results as modelling the integrated company as one problem.  
Q.E.D. 
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APPENDIX B.  Bilateral Market Power in the FSU gas sector 
This appendix describes a simple two-person bargaining game with transferable utility 
(gains are measured in a common currency, e.g. US$) between a buyer (Player B) and a seller 
(Player S). Player B is a downstream player in the sense that it makes a profit from re-selling gas 
bought from player S to final customers. 
The bargaining game is said to be a game with transferable utility if, in addition to the 
strategy option available to players, each player can: (i) give any amount of money to any other 
player, or (ii) simply destroy money (Myerson, 1991, 384). Each unit of net monetary outflow 
decreases the utility of a player by one unit. Thus, players’ utilities are assumed to be linear in 
money, i.e. if player B decides to transfer t money to player S, then the loss in player B’s utility due 
to the transfer of t is the same as the gains received by S from this transfer t. When there is 
transferable utility, a two-person bargaining problem can be fully characterized by three numbers 
(Myerson, 1991: p. 385): 
1. Π is the maximum transferable utility available to the players if they cooperate, 
2.   
  is the disagreement payoff to player S, and 
3.   
  is the disagreement payoff to player B. 
According to Myerson (1991: p. 385), the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1953) of a game with 
transferable utility is: 
 
  
    
  
 
 
(    
    
 ) (B.1) 
  
    
  
 
 
(    
    
 ) (B.2) 
which indicates that the seller’s and the buyer’s profits,   
        
 , are guaranteed by their 
disagreement payoffs (  
     
 ) and half of the total surplus from cooperation. 
The maximum transferable utility (or profit) Π is achieved if both players are modelled as a 
vertically integrated company (joint profit maximization), or (as argued in Appendix A) if buyers 
and sellers behave perfectly competitively. Therefore, sales/export relations between FSU 
countries in the model in the main text are assumed to be competitive. The connection between 
the model presented in the main text and the bargaining model in this appendix is that the former 
is used to define the maximum joint profit Π and the disagreement point (  
     
 ). Having 
obtained Π and (  
     
 ) from the equilibrium gas model, the analysis of the bargaining game is 
done ex-post.  
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 APPENDIX C. Data and Assumptions for the Base Case 
 
1. Structural Assumptions 
In the Base Case it is assumed that only producers behave imperfectly by behaving a l{ 
Cournot. This assumption was chosen because the results obtained under this market power 
scenario are more consistent with historical data than other market power assumptions 
(successive oligopolies and perfect competition assumptions). Sensitivity analysis of alternative 
structural assumptions is discussed in Appendix G. Gas producers located in the following 
countries are assumed to be perfectly competitive:30 
- Germany 
- Italy 
- Poland 
- Romania 
- Hungary. 
Moreover, gas produced in these countries is prioritized for domestic consumption and is 
not exported.31 
 
2. Natural Gas Demand  
In this model, the linear demand function for natural gas is used as specified by eq. (10) in 
Section 3.4.1.1. The price elasticity of the demand function is as follows: 
 
    
   
 
   
 
  
 
  
  (C.1) 
 
Then, using (C.1), the parameters of the linear demand function are as follows: 
 
 
                                                        
30 This assumption seems plausible since the import requirements of European countries are much higher than their 
indigenous production. Moreover, security of supply concerns would not allow domestic production to be “withheld” 
for strategic reasons. Smeers (2008: p. 25) argues that modelling domestic EU producers as a competitive fringe that 
cannot exercise market power is more adequate.  Holz et al. (2008) made a similar assumption. 
31 Holz et al. (2008) made a similar assumption concerning the EU’s indigenous gas production. 
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 (  
 
  
)  (C.2) 
 
Linear inverse demand functions are specified at assumed elasticity and 2009 price-quantity 
pairs (see Table C.1). 
 
Table C.1: Market Prices, Consumption (2009) and Assumed Elasticity 
Country 
Consumptiona 
 (bcm) 
Priceb  
(US$/tcm) Elasticityc 
Western and Southern Europe 
Finland 4.3 611.2 
-0.7 
Baltic States32 4.6 525.2 
Austria 8.8 583.5 
Belgium 18.5 593.8 
Spain and 
Portugal 38.7 622.3 
France 44.5 607.1 
Netherlands 48.8 625.3 
Italy 81.3 654.8 
UK 90.8 513.7 
Germany 92.6 648.9 
Eastern Europe and Balkans 
Slovenia 1.0 687.3 
-0.7 
Bulgaria 2.7 594.1 
Balkan States33 2.7 542.3 
Croatia 2.9 388.8 
Greece 3.5 704.4 
Slovak Republic 6.1 583.9 
Czech Republic 8.2 547.5 
Hungary 11.3 565.0 
Romania 13.8 276.7 
Poland 16.4 442.2 
Turkey 35.1 475.9 
FSU 
Moldova 3.0 245.0 
-0.5 
Belarus 17.9 190.0 
Ukraine 59.0 187.0 
Russia 429.5 60.5 
Source: a (IEA, 2010); b for FSU countries (Pirani et al., 2010); for all other countries - (IEA, 2010; Eurostat, 2010); c for 
FSU countries (Tarr and Thomson, 2004), for all other markets (Holz et al., 2008). 
 
                                                        
32 Baltic States: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia; Iberian Peninsula: Spain and Portugal 
33 Balkan States: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania 
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In order to analyse future scenarios (up to 2030) of gas market developments using the 
model, projections of both gas demand and prices are needed. For the Base Case, the IEA’s WEO 
2009 forecast (“reference case”) is used (IEA, 2009). Therefore, the following compound annual 
demand growth rate (CAGR) is assumed for the Base Case (2010-2030): 
 +0.7% for Western and Southern Europe 
 +0.8% for Eastern Europe and Balkans 
 +0.4% for FSU Countries. 
Since energy demand forecasts face many uncertainties, a sensitivity analysis is conducted 
on the demand forecast for the Base Case results (see Appendix G). For gas price projection it is 
assumed that gas prices will increase at an average CAGR of 1.4% (2010-2030), which is based on 
the forecast of natural gas price made by the IEA (2009) in its reference case. 
 
3. Production Capacities 
To use the model to explore future scenarios of gas market developments it is necessary to 
make assumptions about future production capacities. This section reports the assumptions for 
the Base Case. The Base Case forecast of production capacities for most countries in this model is 
based on the reference case of IEA’s WEO 2009 (IEA, 2009) (see Table C.2). 
The data on the Romanian and Polish gas production outlooks are based on (EC, 2008b). The 
Hungarian production profile was obtained from projections made by experts from the Hungarian 
Energy Office (Kőrösi, 2006).34 For the Norwegian and Russian production forecasts, (Soderbergh 
et al., 2009) and (Soderbergh, 2010) are relied on, respectively. The authors provide detailed 
forecasts of natural gas production in Norway (Table C.2 row 12-14) and Russia (Table C.2 row 
19-21) by major producing regions. Their forecasts have been modelled using a bottom-up 
approach, building field-by-field, and then adding production from contingent and undiscovered 
resources. The Russian production forecast provided by Soderbergh (2010) is quite close to 
Russia’s official gas production forecast (Shmatko, 2009). In Appendix G the results of the 
sensitivity analysis on the Norwegian and Russian production forecasts are provided. Ukrainian 
production is assumed to decrease at an average rate of 1.2% p.a. The decline rate is based on the 
gas production forecast for Eastern Europe (EC, 2008b).35 The production outlook of Central Asian 
countries and countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Latin America 
                                                        
34 The forecast was up to 2015, so the projection of Hungarian gas production was extended based on the average 
growth rate assumed in (Kőrösi, 2006) 
35 The justification for this assumption is that the production fields in Ukraine are mature, which is quite similar to 
those of some Eastern European countries such as Romania and Hungary; thus, without any publically available data 
on Ukrainian gas production forecasts, this assumption is relied upon. 
 
 
Page 70 of 107 
(Trinidad and Tobago) are derived as production less domestic demand (i.e. export capacities). 
Production and demand forecasts for these countries are derived from the reference case of the 
IEA’s WEO 2009 (IEA, 2009). 
 
Table C.2: Natural Gas Production Capacities (bcm/y) 
 
 
2009 2015 2020 2025 2030 
1 Algeria 62 76 86 94 103 
2 Azerbaijan 8 11 18 25 33 
3 Denmarka 9 6 3 2 1 
4 Egypt 18 17 15 11 7 
5 Germany 14 13 13 12 11 
6 Hungary 3 1 1 0 0 
7 Italy 8 7 7 7 6 
8 Kazakhstan 4 10 18 26 34 
9 Libya 11 14 19 26 35 
10 Netherlands 79 71 64 52 43 
11 Nigeria 37 44 56 78 109 
12 Norway: Barents Sea 6 14 22 25 24 
13 Norway: North Sea 64 66 62 55 48 
14 Norway: Norwegian Sea 43 43 46 37 31 
15 Oman 12 3 0 0 0 
16 Poland 6 5 5 5 5 
17 Qatar 70 140 150 166 185 
18 Romania 11 10 10 9 9 
19 Russia: Shtokman 0 0 5 33 64 
20 Russia: Western Siberia 690 675 575 475 380 
21 Russia: Yamal Peninsula 0 100 170 270 350 
22 Trinidad and Tobago 34 34 38 43 48 
23 Turkmenistan 27 74 84 94 104 
24 UK 62 44 31 23 19 
25 Ukraine 21 20 18 17 16 
26 Uzbekistan 15 15 15 16 17 
Source: a (DEA, 2010) 
 
4. Pipeline Capacities 
Table C.3 presents the cross-border pipeline capacities used in the model. There is no 
explicit modelling of intra-country transmission systems in the current version of the model, i.e. 
unlimited transmission capacities within a country are assumed. The primary source of cross-
border pipeline capacities is (ENTSOG, 2010). In addition, various other sources are relied on for 
cross-border pipelines not covered in (ENTSOG, 2010). 
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Table C.3: Capacities of Cross-border Pipelines 
From To 
Capacity 
(bcm/y) From To 
Capacity 
(bcm/y) 
Algeria Spain 11.14 Italy Slovenia 0.91 
Algeria Italy 34.26 Kazakhstand Russia 54.80 
Austria Germany 8.39 Libya Italy 9.99 
Austria Italy 37.06 Netherlands UK 15.33 
Austria Slovenia 2.45 Netherlands Belgium 28.03 
Austria Hungary 4.19 Netherlands Belgium 14.70 
Azerbaijana Russia 10.00 Netherlands Germany 13.54 
Azerbaijanb Turkey 7.00 Netherlands Germany 31.81 
Belarus Lithuania 10.50 Netherlands Germany 9.08 
Belarus Poland 30.60 Norway UK 13.87 
Belarus Poland 5.25 Norway UK 25.55 
Belarusc Ukraine 28.90 Norway France 19.71 
Belarusc Ukraine 6.00 Norway Belgium 15.33 
Belgium UK 25.39 Norway 
Germany and 
Netherlands 42.38 
Belgium Netherlands 10.21 Poland Germany 30.60 
Belgium Germany 9.25 Romania Bulgaria 26.50 
Belgium France 28.04 Russiae 
Belarus (Yamal-
Europe) 33.00 
Bulgaria Macedonia 0.76 Russiaf 
Belarus (Northern 
Lights) 51.00 
Bulgaria Greece 3.54 Russiac Ukraine (Sudja) 113.00 
Bulgaria Turkey 15.35 Russiac Ukraine (Sokhranivka) 135.10 
Czech 
Republic Germany 15.55 Russiae Turkey (Blue Stream) 16.00 
Czech 
Republic Germany 37.57 Russia Latvia 5.40 
France Switzerland 7.14 Russia Finland 8.15 
France Spain 3.12 Slovak Republic Czech Republic 40.46 
Germany Poland 1.12 Slovak Republic Austria 52.44 
Germany Austria 3.51 Slovenia Croatia 1.74 
Germany Switzerland 17.34 Spain France 1.25 
Germany France 20.03 Turkey Greece 0.99 
Germany Belgium 15.88 Ukrainec Poland 5.00 
Germany Netherlands 13.38 Ukrainec Slovakia 92.60 
Germany Czech Republic 12.89 Ukrainec Hungary 13.20 
Hungary Croatia 6.64 Ukrainec Romania 4.50 
Hungary Serbia 4.57 Ukrainec Moldova 3.50 
Hungary Romania 1.66 Ukrainec Romania 26.80 
Source: a (Korotkov, 2009); b (BP, 2010b); c (Naftogaz of Ukraine, 2010); d (Yenikeyeff, 2008); e (Gazprom, 2008); f 
(Yafimava, 2009). 
Future pipeline capacities included in the model are presented in Table C.4. The reported 
capacities and start times of these pipelines are based on the official plans of the respective 
project sponsors (except for the South Stream system). The assumption in this work about the 
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South Stream route is based on (South Stream AG, 2010a). The exact capacities of the pipelines 
which are part of the system are not yet known. Therefore, the reported capacities are 
assumptions. It is assumed that the start time of the South Stream system is 2016, in line with 
Gazprom’s official plan (Gazprom, 2010e). 
 
Table C.4: Future Pipelines in the Model 
From To 
Capacity 
(bcm/y) Start time 
Nord Stream Systema 
Russia 
Germany (Nord 
Stream Offshore) 55.0 2011-2012 
Germany Czech Republic (OPAL) 35.0 2011 
Germany 
Germany, Rehden 
(NEL) 20.0 2012 
Czech 
Republic Germany (Gazelle) 32.0 2011 
South Stream System 
Russia Bulgaria36 63.0 2016 
Bulgaria Serbia 43.0 2016 
Bulgaria Greece 20.0 2016 
Greece Italy 20.0 2016 
Serbia Hungary 43.0 2016 
Hungary Austria (Baumgaren) 21.5 2016 
Hungary Slovenia 21.5 2016 
Slovenia Austria (Arnoldstein) 21.5 2016 
Algerian Export Pipelines 
Algeria Spain (Medgaz)b 8.0 2010 
Algeria Italy (Galsi)c 8.0 2014 
Source: a (Nord Stream AG, 2010a; OPAL, 2010; NEL, 2010; NET4GAS, 2010); b (Medgaz, 2010); c (Galsi, 2010) 
 
5. LNG Capacities 
As for LNG, all producers who currently export LNG to Europe, as reported in (BP, 2010a), 
are included. The liquefaction capacities of LNG exporters included in the model are assumed to 
grow at rates as reported in WEO 2009 up to 2013 (IEA, 2009) (see Table C.5 below). Any attempt 
to look beyond that date for developments in liquefaction capacities is rather speculative, so it is 
assumed that liquefaction capacities are at the level of 2013 thereafter. This gas market model is a 
regional model which does not include other demand regions such as the North American and 
Asia Pacific regions, which are important LNG importing regions. Therefore, not all LNG exports 
might be available for European consumption. However, for this analysis it is assumed that any 
demand for LNG from Europe may be satisfied, given the export capabilities of LNG producers. 
                                                        
36 South Stream offshore 
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This might be true if European gas demand was high, which would push gas prices upwards and 
thus make LNG exporters willing to export more LNG to Europe. Another justification for this 
assumption is rapid developments in unconventional gas in North America which will free LNG 
capacities for Europe in the future. 
As for regasification capacities in Europe, the model includes all regasification terminals as 
of 2009. The forecasting of LNG regasification capacities in Europe is based on (Gas Strategies, 
2007). The Gas Strategies regasification data were gathered in 2007 during high energy prices and 
strong demand in Europe, and thus some of the LNG regasification projects may look very 
speculative now. For this reason, for the Base Case it is assumed that 50% of the Gas Strategies 
forecast of LNG regasification capacities will materialize (see Table C.5). This assumption is 
checked with a sensitivity analysis (see Appendix G). 
 
Table C.5: LNG Liquefaction and Regasification Capacities 
 
2009 2015 2020 2025 2030 
LNG Liquefaction 
Algeria 28 41 41 41 41 
Egypt 16 16 16 16 16 
Libya 1 1 1 1 1 
Nigeria 30 31 31 31 31 
Norway 6 6 6 6 6 
Oman 15 15 15 15 15 
Qatar 73 105 105 105 105 
Russia's Shtokman 0 0 20 20 20 
Trinidad and Tobago 20 20 20 20 20 
LNG Regasification 
Belgium 9 9 9 9 9 
France Atlantic 13 23 23 23 23 
France Mediterranean 13 17 17 17 17 
Italy 12 65 65 65 65 
Netherlands 0 12 12 12 12 
North-West Spaina 15 20 20 20 20 
Poland 0 3 3 3 3 
South-East Spain 44 66 66 66 66 
UK 47 72 72 72 72 
a Includes capacity of LNG terminal in Portugal 
 
6. Production Costs 
Usually, natural gas production comes from several fields simultaneously with distinct cost 
structures. We assume that the cheapest gas fields are developed and produced first. This leads to 
an increasing marginal cost function in the following form (Golombek and Gjelsvik, 1995): 
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                (  
 
     
) (C.3) 
                   
 
where κ is the minimum per unit cost, ρ is the linearly increasing per unit cost, and μ is the 
maximum per unit production cost. The parameters for the production cost function for each 
producer in our model are presented in Table C.6. These parameters were computed based on a 
large number of sources. 
 
Table C.6: Production Costs 
Country Region Parameters of Marginal Production Cost Function 
κ ρ μ 
Russia 
Western Siberia 
Fieldsa 
15.12 0 -3.13 
Orenburgb 2.08 0 -2.71 
Yamal Peninsulab 7.65 0 -9.97 
Shtokman Fieldb 10.81 0 -14.08 
Ukrainec 5.9 0 -7.69 
Central Asiaf 5.36 0 -6.98 
Norway 
North Seab 5.63 0 -7.33 
Norwegian Seab 4.99 0 -6.50 
Barents Seab 11.24 0 -14.64 
UKe 83.69 0.0293 -4.88 
Netherlandse 27.90 0.1116 -9.35 
Denmarke 55.79 0.2036 -9.35 
Germanye 83.69 0.0209 0 
Italye 83.69 0.2357 0 
Polande 83.69 0.5551 0 
Hungarye 83.69 1.0182 0 
Romaniae 83.69 0.2315 0 
Algeriad 22.97 0.1104 -2.50 
Egyptd 27.74 0.3634 -4.00 
Libyad 24.42 0.3431 -3.50 
Qatard 6.51 0.1317 -6.10 
Omanh 1.713 0 -2.232 
Trinidad and Tobagoe 27.90 0.0683 -7.67 
Nigeriae 27.90 0.0781 -7.67 
a Derived using data in (World Bank, 2009)  
b Derived using data in (OME, 2001; IEA, 2003; IEA, 2009; World Bank, 2009) 
c Derived using data in (Pirani, 2007) 
d Derived using data in (OME, 2001; IEA, 2003; IEA, 2005; IEA, 2009; World Bank, 2009) 
e Source: (Egging et al., 2008) 
f Derived using data in (IEA, 2009); Includes: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 
h Derived using data in (OME, 2001) 
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7. Transport Costs 
7.1. Transmission costs within EU 
Existing transmission tariffs in European countries are extremely complex and vary greatly 
from one pipeline system to another. For transmission costs in Western European countries we 
rely on a comprehensive study by Arthur D. Little (2008), who provides a detailed comparison of 
gas transportation tariffs charged by the transmission system operators of 12 West European 
countries. 
For transmission tariffs through other countries, not covered in (Arthur D. Little, 2008), we 
use official tariffs published by the TSO of the respective country (e.g., through Hungary, Slovakia, 
the Czech Republic, etc.). Lastly, when data on transmission costs are not published, transmission 
costs are estimated using the methodology discussed in (van Oostvoorn, 2003). 
 
7.2. Transmission costs within Russia 
7.2.1. The existing transmission system 
Following the World Bank (2009), it is assumed that, in Russia at least, transmission costs 
for gas exports should be priced at the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) of a new transmission 
pipeline. Up-to-date publicly available estimates of LRMCs for gas transmission within Russia are 
rather rare and inconsistent (Table C.7). For instance, OME (2001) estimated the LRMC of 
transporting gas from Russia’s production regions to different export routes at US$ 
2.00/tcm/100km. On the other hand, the World Bank (2009) estimated the LRMC of gas 
transmission in Russia at US$ 1/tcm/100km and, specifically for gas transportation on the Yamal 
Peninsula (difficult terrain), at US$ 2.5/tcm/100km.37 
The gas transmission tariff approved by the Russian Federal Tariff Service (FTS) might be a 
good approximation of LRMC, assuming that the FTS retains a two-tier system of transmission 
tariffs with gas exports being priced at the LRMC of a new transmission pipeline and the domestic 
market benefiting from depreciated long-installed pipelines38 (FTS, 2010; World Bank, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
37 These estimates are based on 12% of the real rate of return (World Bank 2009: p. 247) 
38 However, the cost differential between these two markets is negligible, since there are increasing needs to 
rehabilitate and expand the existing grid (see e.g., (FTS, 2010; World Bank, 2009: p. 247)).  
 
 
Page 76 of 107 
Table C.7: Estimates of the LRMC of Gas Transmission in Russia 
 OME 
(2001) 
World 
Bank 
(2009) 
FTS 
(2010)a 
IEA (2009) (Tarr and 
Thomson, 
2004) 
Average 
LRMC, 
US$/tcm/100km 
2.0 1.0 1.9 1.6 1.0 1.5 
LRMC (difficult 
terrain), 
US$/tcm/100km 
n/a 2.5 n/a n/a n/a 2.5 
a Calculated at the official exchange rate of RUB 30.51 per 1 US$ as of 23 August 2010 (CBR, 2010) 
 
Since the pipeline costs are essentially linear in terms of distance over similar terrain (ECT, 
2006), total transmission costs between Russia’s production regions and export points are simply 
the product of distances between producing regions and export points and the average values of 
LRMC reported in Table C.7.39 Resultant transmission costs for Russia are presented in Table C.8. 
 
Table C.8: LRMC of Gas Transmission in Russia (US$/tcm) 
TO 
 
 
FROM                         
Russia-
Ukraine 
border 
(Sudja) 
Russia-Ukraine 
border 
(Sokhranivka) 
Russia-
Belarus 
border 
(Smolensk) 
Nord 
Stream 
(Vyborg) 
Blue and 
South 
Streams 
(Dzhubga) 
Nadym-Pur-Taz 
(Urengoi Field) 
48.20 47.94 42.88 52.83 54.86 
Volga (Orenburg 
Field) 
26.30 16.31 31.96 40.96 23.97 
Yamal Peninsula 
(Bovanenkovo 
Field) 
63.05 62.78 42.53 52.48 69.70 
Shtokman 42.16 46.42 37.90 32.25 57.61 
Alexandrov Gaia 18.77 8.78 24.50 33.50 16.51 
Azerbaijan-
Russia Border 
19.92 15.28 31.96 46.82 12.76 
a Alexandrov Gai is the compressor station near the Kazakhstan-Russia border. This is the gas import point from 
Central Asia into Russia. 
 
7.2.2. Nord Stream and South Stream 
Transportation costs through the Nord Stream and South Stream systems were calculated in 
two steps:  
(i) The initial construction costs of the Nord Stream and South Stream systems were 
estimated, and then 
(ii) the levelized transportation costs (LTC) over the economic life of the gas pipeline 
projects were derived.  
                                                        
39 Calculations of transmission costs on the Yamal Peninsula are based on the LRMC reported by World Bank (2009) 
(Table C.7, second row) 
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The LTC through the Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines includes construction costs, 
capital costs, operating and maintenance costs and profit tax. Appendix E contains a detailed 
outline of the methodology and data input required for derivation of the levelized transport cost. 
The initial estimates of the construction costs of the Nord Stream system and relevant data and 
assumptions required for the LTC calculations are in Appendix F (Section 1). The construction 
costs of the South Stream system were derived using the pipeline cost methodology discussed in 
Appendix D. Other input data and assumptions needed for the calculation of the LTC through the 
South Stream system are outlined in Appendix F (Section 2). Tables C.9 and C.10 outline the 
results of the estimates of LTCs for the Nord Stream and South Stream systems.  
 
Table C.9: Levelized Transportation Costs through the Nord Stream System (US$/tcm) 
 Gryazovets-
Vyborg 
Nord Stream 
Offshore 
Opal Nel 
 
Gazelle 
Max 26.1 30.2 6.2 13.7 3.1 
Average 20.6 21.1 4.9 11.1 2.5 
Min 15.5 13.8 3.7 8.6 2.0 
 
Table C.10: Levelized Transportation Costs through the South Stream System (US$/tcm) 
From To Max Average Min 
Offshore pipelines 
Russia (Dzhubga) Bulgaria (Varna) 23.7 16.9 11.4 
Greece (Igoumenitsa) Italy (Otranto) 15.9 11.8 8.3 
Onshore pipelines 
Bulgaria (Varna) Serbia (Zajecar) 11.2 8.4 6.0 
Bulgaria (Varna) Greece (Petrich) 9.2 6.9 4.9 
Greece (Petrich) Greece (Igoumenitsa) 12.0 9.0 6.4 
Serbia (Zajecar) Hungary (Subotica) 11.3 8.5 6.1 
Hungary (Subotica) Austria (Baumgarten) 7.6 5.7 4.0 
Hungary (Subotica) Slovenia 5.6 4.2 3 
Slovenia Austria (Arnoldstein) 5.0 3.7 2.7 
 
For South Stream in Bulgaria, it is assumed that the pipeline will be connected to the existing 
grid there; therefore, for sales to Macedonia through South Stream, Gazprom should pay the 
existing transit fee because it uses the existing transmission system of Bulgaria. The same is true 
for Gazprom’s sales to Turkey through South Stream. 
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7.3. Transport costs through Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia 
7.3.1. The exogenous transit fee through Ukraine 
According to the current long-term transit contract (Ukrainska Pravda, 2009), since 2010 
the transit fee through Ukraine, Tn, has been determined as follows: 
 
         (C.4) 
                 [             ] (C.5) 
   
       
 
     
(C.6) 
 
where A2010=US$2.04/tcm/100km; for 2010, An-1=A2010; In is the inflation rate in the European 
Union; for 2010 In-1=0; Kn is the fuel gas component of the transit fee formula, which is determined 
monthly; Pn is the Ukrainian annual average import price; L – transit distance through Ukraine 
(1240 km); Subscript n – relevant year of transportation. 
 
In this gas simulation model, fuel gas required for compressors along pipelines is assumed to 
be provided in kind by producers/shippers.40 Therefore, Kn is not considered as part of the transit 
fee through Ukraine (i.e., Kn=0) in the forecasting of the transit fee through this country. The 
forecasting of the transit fee through Ukraine up to 2030 is based on the transit pricing formula 
specified by eq. (C.5). According to (C.5), the calculation of the transit fee requires the forecasting 
of the inflation rate. Possible future values of the inflation rate have been simulated, taking its 
value as an uncertain variable with a historical distribution of the average inflation rate in 1997-
2009. The average value of the transit fee obtained from the simulations is US$ 
2.07/tcm/100km.41 
 
7.3.2. The transit fee through Belarus 
In 2010 Gazprom pays US$ 1.88/tcm/100km to Beltransgaz as the transit fee for using the 
Belarus transit system (Northern Light, which is owned by Beltransgaz) (Gazprom, 2010d). For 
gas transportation services through the Belarus section of the Yamal-Europe pipeline, Gazprom 
pays only US$ 0.49/tcm/100km to Beltransgaz since Gazprom is the sole owner of the pipeline 
section (Ryabkova, 2010). This fee includes only the operating and O&M costs of the pipeline. 
 
                                                        
40 Most transit/transmission operators in Europe (e.g. BOG in Austria, NET4GAS in Czech Republic, and Eustream in 
Slovakia) ask shippers to provide fuel gas in kind. 
41 The minimum value is US$ 2.06/tcm/100km and the maximum value is US$ 2.08/tcm/100km. 
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7.3.3. The marginal cost of using transmission pipelines in Ukraine and Belarus 
Since the transit systems of Ukraine and Belarus (the Northern Light system) were built 
during the Soviet era using similar materials and technology to those used for the construction of 
the Russian transmission system, it is assumed that the LRMC through Ukraine and Belarus is 
similar to the LRMC in Russia (Table C.8, average value). Table C.11 reports the LRMC through 
Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
Table C.11: LRMC through Ukraine and Belarus (US$/tcm) 
 
 
Russia 
(Sudja) 
Russia 
(Sokhranivka) 
Belarus 
(Kobryn) 
Belarus 
(Mozyr) 
Russia 
(Smolensk) 
B
el
ar
u
s 
Lithuania (Kotlovka) 
n/ap 
6.86 
Poland (Brest) 8.99 
Ukraine (Kobryn) 8.99 
Ukraine (Mozyr) 5.45 
U
k
ra
in
e 
Poland (Drozdovychi) n/ap n/ap 5.75 n/ap 
n/ap 
Slovakia (Uzhgorod) 18.10 22.53 8.39 10.79 
Hungary (Beregovo) 18.10 22.53 8.39 10.79 
Romania (Tekovo) 18.10 22.53 8.39 10.79 
Moldova (Anan’iv) n/ap 14.38 n/ap n/ap 
Romania (Orlovka) n/ap 17.62 n/ap n/ap 
n/ap – Not applicable 
 
7.3.4. The Central Asia-Centre Pipeline 
In 2008, the transit fee through the Central Asia-Centre pipeline which brings Central Asian 
gas into Russia was US$ 1.4/tcm/100km (Yenikeyeff, 2008). This value is assumed in the Base 
Case scenario. 
 
7.4. Other transport costs 
7.4.1. The Norwegian pipeline system 
The calculation of transport costs through the Norwegian transmission system is as follows. 
Efficient pricing of gas transmission through the Norwegian system is assumed, i.e. based on the 
LRMC of the new transmission system being similar to the existing one. The current value of the 
investment cost of the Norwegian transmission pipelines is based on (NPD, 2010). For the 
calculation of LRMC through a particular transmission pipeline, a 10% real interest rate is 
assumed. The economic life-time of a pipeline is assumed to be 25 years and corporate income tax 
is 28% (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2010). The results of the calculations are presented below 
(Table C.12). 
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Table C.12: LRMC of the Norwegian Transmission System (US$/tcm) 
TO 
 
FROM                         
UK  
(St. Fergus) 
UK 
(Easington) 
France 
(Dunkerque) 
Belgium 
(Zeebrugge) 
Germany and 
Netherlands 
(Emden/Dornum) 
North Sea (Troll 
Field) 
54.46 7.78 11.81 36.81 21.94 
Norwegian Sea 
(Asgard Field) 
64.22 15.56 21.57 46.58 31.71 
Barents Sea 
(Snøhvit Field) 
86.59 37.92 43.94 68.94 54.08 
 
Since there is no pipeline connection between the Barents Sea and the existing Norwegian 
transmission system, a new pipeline with a capacity of 20 bcm/y is assumed. This capacity 
corresponds to the forecast of peak production from the Barents Sea (which is around 25 bcm less 
the liquefaction capacity of Snøhvit LNG plant, 6 bcm/y). This assumption is necessary for the 
calculation of marginal transportation costs from the Barents Sea to different pipeline export 
points. 
 
7.4.2. The Algerian and Libyan export pipelines 
Transport costs for Algerian and Libyan gas through export pipelines are based on (OME, 
2001).  
 
7.5. Pipeline Losses 
Pipeline losses of 0.125% per 100 km are assumed (Desertec, 2010). 
 
7.6. LNG Liquefaction, shipping and regasification costs 
In this model version, a constant marginal cost for LNG liquefaction and regasification is 
assumed, i.e. 
         
   
 
   
            and 
          
  
     
 
  
  
             . Based on (EIA, 
2003), mcliq=US$ 49/tcm and mcreg=US$ 12.50/tcm. The calculation of the LNG shipping cost is as 
follows. A representative harbour in each country was chosen and approximate distances were 
calculated between each pair of LNG countries in the model. Then, taking into account distances 
and assuming that a LNG vessel cruises at an average speed of 20 knots,42 approximate voyage 
days between a liquefaction site and a regasification terminal were estimated (see Table C.13).  
 
                                                        
42 This speed has been accepted in the LNG vessel market as the most optimal speed for LNG carriers (MAN Diesel 
A/S, 2010). 
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Table C.13: Voyage Days from Liquefaction Sources to Regasification Countries43 
  
Liquefaction Country 
Norway Russiaa Algeria Libya Qatar Oman Egypt 
Trinidad 
& Tobago Nigeria 
R
eg
as
if
ic
at
io
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
y 
UK 4.3 4.4 3.8 6.2 13.7 12.7 7.0 8.8 9.8 
Germany 3.6 4.2 4.8 7.1 14.6 13.6 8.0 9.1 10.8 
Italy 8.0 8.7 2.4 3.0 10.3 9.3 3.8 9.9 9.9 
France Atlantic 4.9 5.3 3.6 5.9 13.4 12.4 6.8 8.0 9.6 
France 
Mediterranean 7.9 8.4 2.1 3.2 10.0 9.5 3.9 9.5 9.5 
North-West Spain 5.2 5.8 2.8 5.0 12.7 11.7 6.0 8.1 8.1 
South East Spain 7.3 7.8 1.5 3.4 10.9 9.9 4.3 8.9 8.9 
Zeebrugge 3.9 4.4 4.3 6.6 14.1 13.1 7.5 9.3 10.2 
Turkey 9.8 10.4 3.9 2.4 8.6 7.6 2.1 11.5 11.5 
Poland 3.9 4.4 5.8 8.1 15.6 14.6 9.0 10.1 11.8 
Greece 9.5 10.2 3.6 2.0 8.6 7.6 2.1 11.2 11.2 
a Shtokman Field 
Source: own calculations based on (Sea Rates, 2010) 
 
Finally, shipping costs are obtained as the product of voyage days and the assumed daily 
charter rate for LNG vessels. The charter rate varies greatly due to several factors – the price of 
the vessel, financial costs and the O&M costs of the ship, as well as the global LNG demand and 
supply situation. For example, according to (EIA, 2003), the daily charter rate could be as low as 
US$ 27,500 per day and as high as US$ 150,000 per day. The current (2010) charter rate for spot 
vessels is reported at US$ 37,500 per day (LNG OneWorld, 2010). An average charter rate of US$ 
71,500 per day is assumed. Following the California Energy Commission (2003), the fuel losses 
during LNG liquefaction, shipping and regasification applied in the model are as follows: (i) 
- Liquefaction – 9%; 
- Shipping – 0.15% per day; 
- Regasification – 2.5%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
43 In addition to cruising days, the voyage days reported in Table C.11 also include the one day required for loading 
and unloading of LNG (Coyle and Patel, 2009). 
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APPENDIX D. Pipeline Cost Methodology 
Cost calculations for onshore pipelines follow the bottom-up engineering model as described 
in (World Bank, 2009). The results of this model are presented in Figure D.1 below.  
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Figure D.1: Pipeline and Compressor costs 
Source: (World Bank, 2009) 
 
The assumption for pipeline pressure is 40/60 bar.g (suction/delivery), which corresponds 
to the design of most regional gas transmission systems (World Bank, 2009). Using higher 
pressure pipelines, for example 100 bar.g pipes with a diameter of 56 inches, could yield 32 
bcm/year of throughput. However, the costs of pipelines and compressors would also rise 
significantly. Using the data provided in Figure D.1, the estimated total costs of onshore pipelines 
are: 
for easy terrain 
 
   
                
                  (D.1) 
 
and for difficult terrain 
 
   
                
                  (D.2) 
 
where    
        – cost of pipeline i (including compressors cost), Di – diameter of the pipeline i. 
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Publicly available data and information on offshore pipeline costs are rather limited. Data 
were assembled on offshore pipeline projects built during 2002-2008 in the US (EIA, 2010) and 
offshore pipelines in the Norwegian North Sea system (NPD, 2010). The data points are quite 
limited in number (41 projects in total – see Table D.1 for descriptive statistics) for very precise 
econometric analysis (see Table D.1 for descriptive statistics); however, a sensitivity analysis will 
be provided on the obtained costs to gain some possible South Stream cost ranges.  
 
Table D.1: Descriptive Statistics of Offshore Pipeline Projects  
 Sample 
Size 
Mean Max Min Std Dev Std. 
Error 
Cost (2008 US$ mln) 41 924.30 5311.30 3.36 1305.01 203.81 
Pipeline Capacity (mmcm/a) 41 8754.70 27010.00 0.70 8657.88 1352.13 
Pipeline length (km) 41 234.80 1200.00 1.61 290.81 45.42 
 
Using the assembled data, the equation is estimated in the following form: 
 
       
                                           (D.3) 
 
where     
        
 is per unit capital cost of offshore pipeline i,  
 
The first estimation of eq. (D.3) indicates that there is a positive autocorrelation 
(DW=1.107). The autocorrelation is removed by transforming the data. The resulting estimation 
of eq. (D.3), which satisfies the major assumptions of the classical regression model, is presented 
in Table D.2 below. 
 
Table D.2: Offshore Pipeline Cost Model 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t R R2 F 
Durbin-
Watson 
B Std. Error Beta 
Ci 5.766 0.842  6.846 
0.873 0.762 60.973 1.910 
α 0.903 0.131 0.585 6.882 
β -0.773 0.073 -0.897 -10.555 
Dependent Variable:        
            
 
The negative coefficient β (-0.773) means that there are economies of scale associated with 
the capacity of a pipeline. A higher capacity results in a reduction of the capital cost per unit of 
pipeline capacity. 
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APPENDIX E. Levelized Transportation Cost Calculation 
The levelized transportation cost through a gas pipeline is calculated using eq. (E.1). 
 
    
                           
                                                                  
 
(E.1) 
 
 Present Value of Total life-cycle cost = (1)+(2)+(3)+(4)+(5) 
 
(1) Investment Costs=E(PCC) + E(CCS) + other costs 
 
                                                         (1.1) 
 
                                                           (1.2) 
 
 
E(PPC) is the Expected Pipeline 
Construction Cost; 
E(CCS) is the Expected Cost of 
Compressor Stations; 
IECp is the Initial Estimated Cost of 
constructing a particular pipeline of the 
Nord Stream system; 
CFp is the uncertain cost factor of 
pipeline construction. This is a random 
variable which is uniformly distributed 
between [0.9; 1.3]; 44  
IECc is the Initial Estimated Cost of 
compressor stations; 
CFc is the uncertain cost factor for 
compressor stations. Again, this is a 
random variable which is uniformly 
distributed between [1; 1.3]; 
Other costs include: 
Upfront payment to obtain financing (in 
case of Nord Stream offshore only) – this 
is a one-off payment to secure the 
financial proposal issued by lenders to 
the borrower (usually termed 
                                                        
44 The lower bound represents a 10% discount on the initial cost estimates because in 2006-2009 steel and 
construction prices increased far above historical rates. The upper bound (1.3) allows the cost of a pipeline to be 
inflated by 30% from IECp. An increase in cost by 30% from initial project budget is based on Barinov (2007), who 
surveyed the cost overruns (and their reasons) of capital intensive projects with a focus on oil and gas industry in the 
CIS. 
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commitment fees). 
 
(2) 
 ∑
             
                  
 
   
          
This is the present value of depreciation 
tax benefit over the economic life of the 
pipeline (N=25).  
The depreciation is determined by the 
straight-line method. For simplicity, we 
assume zero scrap value and 
decommissioning costs at the end of the 
depreciation period. The assumption is 
made because the depreciation period is 
much shorter than technical lifetime of a 
gas pipeline. 
 
(3) 
 ∑
    
                  
 
   
              
This is the present value of the annual 
operating and maintenance costs of the 
pipeline and compressor stations. 
Annual O&M for the pipeline is 
determined as a % of the capital costs of 
the pipeline (item 1 above).  
 
(4) 
 ∑
                      
                  
 
   
              
The present value of annual payments 
for debt financing (where applicable) is 
added to the total life-cycle costs of the 
pipeline. 
(5) 
 ∑
                  
                  
 
   
 
This is the present value of loan 
amortization (where applicable). In the 
case of 100% equity financing (e.g. the 
Gryazovets-Vyborg pipeline on Russian 
territory) this item is not included in the 
total lifecycle cost of the pipeline. 
 Present Value of Total gas transported over the life-cycle cost is derived as follows: 
 
(6) 
∑
                                        
                  
 
   
 
The utilization rate (%) is the average 
transportation capacity usage rate over 
the economic life of the pipeline (N=25). 
We assume a 100% utilization rate but 
we also show calculations for the case of 
a 75% utilization rate. 
Box E.1: Calculation of Levelized Transportation Costs 
 
All necessary inputs and assumptions for the calculation of levelized transportation costs 
(LTC) through Nord Stream and South Stream are provided in Appendix F below.  
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APPENDIX F. Data and Assumptions for the Derivation of the Costs of Nord Stream 
and South Stream 
1. Nord Stream 
1.1. Investment Costs 
1.1.1. Gryazovets-Vyborg Pipeline 
The construction costs of the Gryazovets-Vyborg (GV) pipeline in Russia are presented in 
Table F.1.  
 
Table F.1: Construction Costs of the Gryazovets-Vyborg Pipeline 
 
Construction Cost  
(US$ Bn) 
Length of Pipeline 
laid (km) 
2006 0.73 144 
2007 1.05 156 
2008 0.88 163 
2009 1.39 134 
2010 2.34 320 
Total 6.39 917 
a Based on the official average annual exchange rates for the respective years obtained from Central Bank of Russian 
Federation (CBR, 2010). 
Source: (Gazprom, 2005; Nazarova, 2009; Korchemkin, 2010; Nazarova, 2010) 
 
The total cost of compressors to be installed along the Gryazovets-Vyborg pipeline was 
derived as follows. The Ukrainian producer of industrial equipments, Frunze, reported that it has 
produced four 25 MWh compressor units for installation at the beginning of the Gryazovets-
Vyborg pipeline (Frunze, 2010). The reported total cost of these compressors is US$52 mln 
(Ukrrudprom, 2010). Thus, if the total compressor power along the pipeline will be 1266 MWh, 
then the estimated cost of the compressors to be equipped along the pipeline should be around 
US$ 660 mln. However, as was reported by Gazprom, the Portovaya Compressor station (366 
MWh), which will compress gas before entering the Nord Stream offshore line, will be equipped 
with Rolls-Royce compressor units with very advanced technology (52 MWh per compressor unit) 
(Gazprom, 2010f). It is thus reasonable to assume that 366 MWh of compressors purchased from 
Rolls-Royce might cost Gazprom considerably more than those from a Ukrainian producer. We 
have factored this in as a cost overrun on purchasing compressors for the pipeline. Therefore, the 
expected costs of the compressor stations along the Gryazovets-Vyborg pipeline are calculated as: 
 
                              (F.1) 
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1.1.2. Nord Stream Offshore 
Initial estimates of the construction costs of the Nord Stream offshore are based on the 
official figure of €7.4 bln, as quoted by Nord Stream AG (NSAG) (Nord Stream AG, 2010a). 
However, as noted above, there might be overruns or delays which would affect project costs.45 
Major drivers of construction cost uncertainty include the uncertain costs of steel, construction, 
engineering and procurement. The expected construction cost for the offshore pipeline is: 
 
                    (F.2) 
 
1.1.3. OPAL, NEL and Gazelle Pipelines 
The capital costs of OPAL and NEL are quoted at €1 bln each (OPAL, 2010; NEL, 2010). For 
the Gazelle project, the official figure for the capital cost is €400 mln (NET4GAS, 2010). As a 
starting point for the calculation of the expected construction costs of these pipelines we use these 
official figures: 
 
 (       )             (F.3) 
                     (F.4) 
                           (F.5) 
 
1.2. Financial Costs: Discount and Interest Rates 
1.2.1. Gryazovets-Vyborg Pipeline 
Since Gazprom is financing the construction of the Gryazovets-Vyborg pipeline, the 
discount rate applied to the project is based on Gazprom’s weighted-average cost of capital, 
WACC, in 2003-2009 (see Table F.2). We treat WACC as a random variable which is uniformly 
distributed in the following range [0.889; 0.1541], with a lower (upper) bound corresponding to 
the minimum (maximum) WACC in 2003-2009. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
45 Indeed recent news, quoting a representative of the Nord Stream pipeline, reported that the cost of the offshore 
pipeline could rise to €8.8 bln (Neftegaz, 2010). 
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1.2.2. Nord Stream Offshore 
Debt Financing 
At the end of August 2009, Nord Stream’s offshore owner and operator confirmed that 
Request for Proposals for the raising of senior debt for financing Phase 1 development have been 
issued to the commercial bank market. According to NSAG, the construction of the offshore 
pipeline is to be financed with 30% equity from shareholders (Gazprom, BASF/Wintershall, E.ON 
Ruhrgas, Gasunie and GDF-Suez) and 70% senior debt. As of mid-March 2010, Nord Stream AG 
has completed a financial deal with the commercial banking market on the financing of the first 
phase of construction. Nord Stream AG has procured a total debt requirement of approximately 
€3.9 bln for Phase 1 from a combination of the following (Mangham, 2009):  
 A syndicated covered loan of up to €3.1 bln provided by a pool of 26 commercial banks. 
The loan is covered by the Export Credit Guarantee Programmes of Germany (Hermes) and 
Italy (SACE), as well as the Untied Loan Guarantee Programme of Germany (UFK). 
 A syndicated loan facility on an uncovered basis for an amount of up to € 800 mln. 
The structure of the loan guarantee is as follows: 
– € 3.1 bln loan as a 16-years loan facility covered by the export credit agencies 
Hermes and Sace, as well as by Germany’s loan guarantee programme (UFK), which 
covers political and commercial risks similarly to Hermes. Hermes will cover €1.6 
bln, UFK - €1 bln and Sace - €500 mln. 
– There is also an €800 mln, 10-year uncovered commercial loan.  
The pricing of the debts is as follows: 
– The €800 mln commercial uncovered loan pays a margin of 275 basis points (bps) 
over EURIBOR pre-completion, 430 bps until year 7 and 450 bps thereafter. The 
commitment fee is 110 bps. 
– The Hermes, UFK and Sace loans pay a margin of 160 bps, 180 bps and 165 bps over 
EURIBOR respectively. The commitment fees are 65 bps, 75 bps and 65 bps, 
respectively. 
Based on these financial conditions, the interest rate on the debt finance is expressed as 
follows: 
 
    
     ∑   [          ] 
 
        ∑   [          ]
 
  (F.6) 
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where c is the share of covered loan in the total debt finance, aj is the share of each export credit 
agency in the total covered loan, pj is the price of each covered loan, aT is the share of the total 
length of the covered loan with a price pT, and EURIBOR is the Euro interbank deposit rate. 
 
As can be seen from the financial conditions for phase I, the loan is a long-term deal and the 
pricing of that loan is based on EURIBOR, so we need the trend of EURIBOR for 16 years into the 
future (the length of the covered loan). We assume that EURIBOR is a random variable with a 
distribution similar to its trend in 1999-2009. This makes the EURIBOR trend in our cash-flow 
model random. 
 
Equity Financing 
Since there are no details yet of the financial conditions of the second phase of the Nord 
Stream offshore pipeline, we assume that the remaining investment costs are financed by NSAG 
shareholders. The costs of equity financing are discussed below. 
 
Project Discount Rate 
Taking into account the cost of debt financing and using the data on the cost of capital for the 
Nord Stream investors (see Table F.2), we have derived the WACC of the offshore pipeline, which 
serves as the basis for the discount rate of the cash-flow model:46 
 
      [         
           (∑        
 
)] 
 
(F.7) 
 
where dNSO  is the share of debt financing in the NSO project, ei - share of each shareholder in 
equity financing, WACCi  is the cost of capital of each shareholder respectively, ID – the weighted-
average interest rate on the debt. 
 
The WACC of each investor in the project is assumed to be a random variable which is 
uniformly distributed with minimum and maximum values as specified in Table F.2. 
 
 
                                                        
46 We assume that the WACC of the other two shareholders of the Nord Stream offshore, Gasunie and GDF SUEZ, are 
similar to those of E.On and BASF, since data on the capital costs of Gasunie and GDF SUEZ were not publicly available. 
This assumption would not substantially undermine our results since both Gasunie and GDF SUEZ have relatively 
small shares in NSAG. 
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Table F.2: WACCs of Shareholders of Nord Stream AG  
 Gazprom BASF E.ON 
Ruhrgas 
2002 n/a n/a n/a 
2003 8.98% n/a 10% 
2004 9.03% n/a 9% 
2005 8.91% n/a 9% 
2006 9.13% 10% 9% 
2007 11.32% 9% 9% 
2008 15.07% 10% 9% 
2009 15.41% 9% 9% 
Min 8.98% 9% 9% 
Max 15.41% 10% 10% 
Source: (BASF, 2007; BASF, 2010a; Bernotat, 2010) 
 
1.2.3. OPAL, NEL and Gazelle projects 
According to BASF’s 2009 annual report (BASF, 2009), Wingas has borrowed €500 mln to 
finance the OPAL project. The interest rate, IDopal, on this loan is 2.5%. However, no information on 
the length of this loan has been provided. Thus, we assume that it is a short-term loan (3 years), 
taking into account its relatively small size. We ran a sensitivity analysis on this assumption and 
found that a short-term loan of 3 years will result in just a 7.8% increase in the levelized 
transportation cost compared to a longer-term loan of 10 years. Thus, the assumption of the 
length of the loan contributes minimally to the cost calculations. The discount rate for the OPAL 
project is derived as follows: 
 
       [           
  (       )          ] (F.8) 
 
where dopal is the share of debt financing, IDopal is the interest rate on the loan; WACCopal is the 
capital cost of Opal’s major investor (BASF and E.ON) and is treated as a random variable with 
uniform distribution from [0.09; 0.10]. 
 
No public information is available on the financing details of the other two pipelines, Nel and 
Gazelle. We assume that they are fully financed by the project sponsors, i.e. Wingas and NET4GAS 
(former RWE Transgas Net, owned by RWE AG (RWE, 2010a)). We use BASF’s WACC (see Table 
F.2) for the discount rate in cost calculations for the Nel project. For the Gazelle project discount 
rate we use RWE’s WACC (9%-10%) in 2002-2009 (RWE, 2010b).  
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1.3. O&M Costs  
Information on the operating and maintenance (O&M) costs of pipelines is difficult to obtain 
because the considered pipelines are not yet in operation, so common practice in the literature is 
followed and O&M costs are assumed to be a fixed fraction of the investment costs of the pipeline 
(ECT, 2006; Krey and Minullin, 2010). The annual O&M costs of pipelines are assumed to be 0.3% 
of the expected investment costs (Wintershall, 2010). For annual O&M costs of compressor 
stations, 4% of the expected cost is assumed (Wintershall, 2010).  
 
1.4. Taxation and Depreciation  
Depreciation and taxation are based on the taxation system of the country through which the 
pipeline passes. For pipelines in Germany (OPAL and NEL), the effective corporate tax rate, 
including trade tax and solidarity tax, is between 29-32% (CFE, 2010), so we assume a rate of 
30%. For the Gazelle pipeline, according to KPMG, the relevant corporate tax in the Czech Republic 
in 2010 would be 19% (KPMG, 2009). 
For the Nord Stream offshore pipeline, according to Nord Stream AG, the taxation issue 
would mainly be under Swiss jurisdiction as the company is registered in Kanton Zug with a 
headquarters of around 140 staff (Nord Stream AG, 2010b). According to the tax system of 
Switzerland and Kanton Zug (Müller-Studer, 2009), Nord Stream AG enjoys special tax privileges 
because the company falls under the category of ‘mixed company’, i.e. a company whose main 
operations are not in Switzerland.47 The effective corporate tax for this type of company is 
10.125% (Müller-Studer, 2009). 
 
2. South Stream 
2.1. Capacity and timing of the project 
The assumed South Stream route is based on the recent publicly available project 
documentation from the developers (see Figure F.1 below) (South Stream AG, 2010a). The exact 
capacities of the pipelines, which are part of the South Stream system, are not known yet. 
Therefore, the reported capacities here are assumptions (see Table F.3, below). The assumed start 
date of the South Stream system is 2016 (Gazprom, 2010e). It is assumed that, like the Nord 
Stream project, South Stream will be launched in stages. In 2016, half of the assumed capacity of 
each pipeline section of the system will be operational. The system’s designed capacity (63 bcm) 
will be available from 2017. 
                                                        
47 At least 80% of operations should be outside Switzerland (Müller-Studer, 2009). 
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Table F.3: South Stream Pipeline System 
From To 
Number 
of lines 
Capacity per 
line (bcm) 
Total 
Capacity 
Offshore pipelines 
Russia (Dzhubga) Bulgaria (Varna) 4 15.75 63.00 
Greece (Igoumenitsa) Italy (Otranto) 2 10.00 20.00 
Onshore pipelines 
Bulgaria (Varna) Serbia (Zajecar) 2 21.50 43.00 
Bulgaria (Varna) Greece (Petrich) 1 20.00 20.00 
Greece (Petrich) Greece (Igoumenitsa) 1 20.00 2016 
Serbia (Zajecar) Hungary (Subotica) 2 21.50 43.00 
Hungary (Subotica) Austria (Baumgarten) 1 21.50 21.50 
Hungary (Subotica) Slovenia 1 21.50 21.50 
Slovenia Austria (Arnoldstein) 1 21.50 21.50 
 
 
Figure F.1: Assumed Route for the South Stream Pipeline System 
Source: based on South-Strea.info 
 
2.2. Cost of capital and project discount rate 
Since feasibility studies of South Stream’s pipeline sections have not started yet, it is 
necessary to make assumptions about the cost of capital and relevant project discount rates. 
These assumptions are based on publicly available information and particularly use data on the 
financing of South Stream’s sister project – Nord Stream (see Appendix F, Section 1.2.2).   
It is assumed that the financing strategy for the South Stream offshore project is similar to 
that for the Nord Stream project. Therefore, the construction of the offshore pipeline would be 
financed with 30% equity from shareholders (Gazprom, ENI) and 70% debt. The cost of capital for 
debt financing is assumed to be similar to the Nord Stream financing cost (see Appendix F, Section 
1.2.2). 
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Gazprom’s weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) is assumed to be to be in the range of 
8.89%-15.41% (Zak, 2006; Lyutyagin, 2010), while the WACC of European energy utility 
companies is assumed to be 9%-10% (similar to the WACC of such companies as E.ON or BASF, 
see Table F.2). 
It is assumed that Gazprom’s stake in all the pipeline sections of the South Stream system is 
51%, while its European partners hold the remainder. 
 
2.3. Project cost overrun 
The costs of large-scale pipeline projects may overrun or their construction may be delayed, 
which would affect project costs. Major drivers of construction cost uncertainty include the costs 
of steel, construction, engineering and procurement. Taking into account uncertainties in project 
implementation (in terms of delays and budget overruns), the expected construction cost of each 
pipeline section of the South Stream system is determined as follows: 
 
              (F.9) 
 
where E(TCn) is the expected total cost (including compressor costs where appropriate) of the 
pipeline section n of the South Stream system; and PCn is the estimated initial project cost. The 
costs of the pipeline and compressors are estimated (where appropriate) for each section of the 
South Stream system based on the methodology described in Appendix D above, and CF is the cost 
factor of pipeline construction, which is a random variable which is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed between [0.9; 1.3]. The lower bound represents a 10% discount on the initial cost 
estimates because in 2006-2009 steel and construction prices increased far above historical rates. 
The upper bound (1.3) allows the cost of a pipeline to be inflated by 30% from the initial estimate, 
PCn. An increase in costs of 30% above the initial project budget is based on (Barinov, 2007). 
 
 
2.4. O&M costs  
The annual O&M costs of the South Stream pipelines are assumed to be 0.3% of the expected 
investment costs (Wintershall, 2010). For the annual O&M costs of compressor stations, 4% of the 
expected cost is assumed (Wintershall, 2010).  
 
2.5. Taxation and depreciation 
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The taxation and depreciation applied to pipeline projects is based on the taxation system of 
the country through which the pipeline passes: 
- Bulgarian corporate tax is assumed to be maintained at 2010 levels - 10% (IFC, 2010a); 
- Corporate tax in Greece is 25% (IFC, 2010b). The offshore part of the project between Greece 
and Italy is assumed to be under Greek tax jurisdiction; 
- Serbian corporate tax is at the level of 2010 - 10% (IFC, 2010d); 
- Hungary – 16% (IFC, 2010c); 
- Slovenia – 22% (IFC, 2010e). 
The operator of South Stream offshore pipeline, South Stream AG, is registered in Kanton Zug, 
Switzerland (South Stream AG, 2010b). The taxation procedure applied to companies registered in 
Kanton Zug is briefly discussed above (Appendix F, Section 1.4). The effective corporate tax 
applied to the operation of the South Stream AG is 10.125%. 
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APPENDIX G.  Model validation and sensitivity analysis 
In this appendix, model validation with historical data (2008-2009) and different sensitivity 
analyses are documented. In Section 1 of this appendix, the model is calibrated with historical 
data from 2008-2009 and the model results are compared under different assumptions of market 
power with historical data. In Sections 2 and 3, the sensitivity of model results to changes in 
exogenous assumptions (such as demand, production, pipeline and LNG capacities, conjectured 
transit demand slope) is tested.   
 
1. Consistency with historical data 
The results of the model calibrated to the 2008-2009 data are presented in Tables G.1a, G.1b 
and G.2. In general, successive oligopolies (where both producers and traders exert market power 
in sequence) result in much higher final prices and lower quantities than in reality. This is 
generally in line with the theory of double-marginalization (Spengler, 1950). On the other hand, 
the perfect competition assumption inflates the results quite substantially. In this case, the 
average final price in Europe is much lower than the observed real price, and consumption is also 
much higher than the real data. 
In general, the results obtained from the upstream oligopoly assumption are in line with 
historical data. Also, they are more consistent with real data than the results obtained from the 
other two market power assumptions.  
There is one common feature in the three market power scenarios - the diversity of the gas 
sources plays a crucial role in the results in terms of final prices and consumption. Less diverse 
countries in terms of supply sources always enjoy higher prices and lower consumption than in 
reality. In contrast, countries with a diverse supply portfolio enjoy lower prices and higher 
consumption compared to reality. In general, this observation is line with economic intuition 
regarding market power and competition. Therefore, the model behaves in a predictable way 
which is in line with fundamental economic intuition and theory.  
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Table D.1a: Model Validation with Historical Data: 2008-2009 
  
  
  
CONSUMPTION (bcm) PRICES (US$/tcm) 
real data model results Difference real data model results Difference 
2008 
[1] 
2009 
[2] 
2008 
[3] 
2009 
[4] 
2008 
[3]/[1] 
2009 
[4]/[2] 
2008 
[5] 
2009 
[6] 
2008 
[7] 
2009 
[8] 
2008 
[7]/[5] 
2009 
[8]/[6] 
UPSTREAM OLIGOPOLY 
Austria 9 9 8 9 94% 98% 584 583 637 604 109% 104% 
Belgium 19 18 19 20 100% 109% 618 594 622 518 101% 87% 
Bulgaria 4 3 3 2 73% 79% 391 594 545 775 139% 130% 
Balkans 3 3 2 2 74% 77% 471 542 649 720 138% 133% 
Baltic States 6 5 4 4 72% 80% 303 525 424 678 140% 129% 
Czech Republic 9 8 7 7 83% 90% 528 547 657 629 124% 115% 
Germany 98 93 104 100 106% 108% 734 649 667 574 91% 88% 
Finland 5 4 4 3 80% 80% 726 611 938 784 129% 128% 
France 46 45 47 48 102% 109% 600 607 580 531 97% 88% 
Greece 4 4 4 4 100% 101% 883 704 885 696 100% 99% 
Croatia 3 3 2 2 68% 73% 338 389 491 538 146% 138% 
Hungary 13 11 11 10 86% 90% 527 565 632 645 120% 114% 
Spain and 
Portugal 43 39 40 39 94% 101% 602 622 652 613 108% 98% 
Italy 88 81 97 97 110% 120% 585 655 502 472 86% 72% 
Netherlands 49 49 45 50 94% 102% 566 625 617 604 109% 97% 
Poland 16 16 16 16 97% 98% 502 442 525 453 105% 103% 
Romania 16 14 17 15 107% 113% 350 277 316 227 90% 82% 
Slovakia 6 6 5 5 73% 78% 521 584 724 766 139% 131% 
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 95% 102% 604 687 650 668 108% 97% 
Turkey 37 35 32 32 88% 92% 585 476 681 531 116% 112% 
UK 99 91 102 99 103% 109% 612 514 586 446 96% 87% 
Average a  27.3 25.6 27.2 27.0 100% 106% 603 582 597 527 99% 90% 
DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION 
Austria 9 9 8 8 87% 87% 584 583.5 689 688 118% 118% 
Belgium 19 18 17 18 88% 95% 618 593.8 724 638 117% 107% 
Bulgaria 4 3 2 2 57% 60% 391 594.1 632 936 161% 158% 
Balkans 3 3 2 2 57% 58% 471 542.3 759 865 161% 160% 
Baltic States 6 5 3 3 57% 60% 303 525.2 488 823 161% 157% 
Czech Republic 9 8 7 6 75% 78% 528 547.5 715 722 135% 132% 
Germany 98 93 90 86 92% 92% 734 648.9 823 720 112% 111% 
Finland 5 4 3 3 61% 61% 726 611.2 1130 954 156% 156% 
France 46 45 42 42 92% 95% 600 607.1 671 653 112% 108% 
Greece 4 4 3 3 79% 80% 883 704.4 1145 907 130% 129% 
Croatia 3 3 2 2 54% 57% 338 388.8 558 630 165% 162% 
Hungary 13 11 9 8 69% 71% 527 565.0 762 799 144% 141% 
Spain and 
Portugal 43 39 40 38 94% 99% 602 622.3 652 631 108% 101% 
Italy 88 81 85 80 96% 99% 585 654.8 617 668 106% 102% 
Netherlands 49 49 41 43 84% 87% 566 625.3 694 738 123% 118% 
Poland 16 16 13 13 80% 80% 502 442.2 647 570 129% 129% 
Romania 16 14 15 13 92% 96% 350 276.7 391 291 112% 105% 
Slovakia 6 6 4 4 59% 60% 521 583.9 827 921 159% 158% 
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 79% 80% 604 687.3 783 883 130% 129% 
Turkey 37 35 26 26 71% 75% 585 475.9 824 649 141% 136% 
UK 99 91 85 81 86% 89% 612 513.7 736 593 120% 115% 
Average a  27.3 25.6 23.6 22.8 87% 89% 603 582  710 662 118% 114% 
a Average final prices are quantity-weighted 
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Table D.1b: Model Validation with Historical Data: 2008-2009 
  
  
  
CONSUMPTION (bcm) PRICES (US$/tcm) 
real data model results Difference real data model results Difference 
2008 
[1] 
2009 
[2] 
2008 
[3] 
2009 
[4] 
2008 
[3]/[1] 
2009 
[4]/[2] 
2008 
[5] 
2009 
[6] 
2008 
[7] 
2009 
[8] 
2008 
[7]/[5] 
2009 
[8]/[6] 
PERFECT COMPETITION 
Austria 9 9 9 10 105% 110% 584 583.5 546 498 93% 85% 
Belgium 19 18 20 20 107% 110% 618 593.8 558 510 90% 86% 
Bulgaria 4 3 3 4 73% 153% 391 594.1 541 148 138% 25% 
Balkans 3 3 3 3 87% 105% 471 542.3 557 503 118% 93% 
Baltic States 6 5 3 7 51% 155% 303 525.2 515 110 170% 21% 
Czech Republic 9 8 8 9 98% 106% 528 547.5 545 498 103% 91% 
Germany 98 93 115 107 117% 115% 734 648.9 553 505 75% 78% 
Finland 5 4 6 7 120% 159% 726 611.2 517 100 71% 16% 
France 46 45 48 49 104% 111% 600 607.1 563 516 94% 85% 
Greece 4 4 5 5 123% 134% 883 704.4 589 360 67% 51% 
Croatia 3 3 2 2 53% 78% 338 388.8 566 511 168% 131% 
Hungary 13 11 13 12 98% 110% 527 565.0 539 485 102% 86% 
Spain and 
Portugal 43 39 42 40 97% 104% 602 622.3 629 587 105% 94% 
Italy 88 81 89 92 101% 114% 585 654.8 574 527 98% 81% 
Netherlands 49 49 49 55 102% 113% 566 625.3 553 505 98% 81% 
Poland 16 16 16 16 95% 98% 502 442.2 536 454 107% 103% 
Romania 16 14 11 18 71% 133% 350 276.7 495 145 141% 52% 
Slovakia 6 6 6 7 98% 111% 521 583.9 539 492 104% 84% 
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 105% 118% 604 687.3 564 509 93% 74% 
Turkey 37 35 38 43 103% 122% 585 475.9 557 327 95% 69% 
UK 99 91 104 107 105% 118% 612 513.7 569 385 93% 75% 
Average a  27.3 25.6 28.1 29.3 103% 115% 603 582 722 667 120% 115% 
a Average final prices are quantity-weighted 
 
Table D.2: Model Validation with Historical Data - Total Expenditure on Gas Consumption 
 
Real Data 
Market Power Scenarios 
Model 
Results Difference 
2008 
[1] 
2009 
[2] 
2008 
[3] 
2009 
[4] 
2008 
[3]/[1] 
2009 
[4]/[2] 
Total Expenditure on 
gas Consumption (US$ 
bln) 
345 312 
Double Marginalization 352 317 102.0% 101.6% 
Upstream Oligopoly 341 298 98.8% 95.6% 
Perfect Competition 333 281 96.3% 89.9% 
 
2. Sensitivity analysis: Demand parameters and infrastructure capacities 
The assumed gas demand projection and infrastructure capacities to be installed between 
2010 and 2030 are rather uncertain parameters in the Base Case. Therefore, the robustness of the 
Base Case results is tested against the following sensitivity scenarios that reflect uncertainties in 
the model parameters (Box G.1): 
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Sensitivity 
Scenarios 
Description 
N1 Elasticity of demand is 100% lower than was assumed in the Base Case, i.e εn=-
1.4 
N2 Elasticity of demand is 100% higher than was assumed in the Base Case, i.e εn=-
0.35 
N3 Russian and Norwegian production capacities are 20% higher than they were 
assumed to be in the Base Case (see Table C.2 for production capacities assumed 
in the Base Case) 
N4 Russian and Norwegian production capacities are 20% lower than they were 
assumed to be in the Base Case 
N5 High demand case: gas demand in 2010-2030 is assumed to grow at a CAGR of: 
 +1.40% for Western and Southern Europe; 
 +1.60% for Eastern Europe and Balkans; 
 +1.20% for FSU Countries. 
N6 Low demand case: gas demand in 2010-2030 is assumed to grow at a CAGR of: 
 +0.35% for Western and Southern Europe; 
 +0.40% for Eastern Europe and Balkans; 
 +0.30% for FSU Countries. 
N7 LNG regasification and liquefaction capacities are 100% higher than was 
assumed for the Base Case (see Table C.5 for the Base Case LNG capacities) 
N8 LNG regasification and liquefaction capacities are 100% lower than was 
assumed for the Base Case 
N9 Cross-border pipeline capacities between EU member states (including the 
Turkish-Greek interconnector) are 100% higher than was assumed in the Base 
Case (see Table C.3 and C.4 for cross-border pipeline capacities); 
N10 Cross-border pipeline capacities between EU member states (including the 
Turkish-Greek interconnector) are 100% lower than was assumed in the Base 
Case. 
Box G.1: Sensitivity Scenarios 
 
The results of the sensitivity analysis are summarized in the following Table G.3. The 
robustness of the model output is measured with the following criteria: 
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(G.1) 
 
where   
  is the output parameter under sensitivity scenario N (e.g. final prices or profits), RBC is 
the same output parameter under the Base Case scenario,   
  is the input parameter under 
sensitivity scenario N (e.g. parameter for elasticity of demand or production capacities etc.), and 
IBC is the same input parameter under the Base Case scenario. Thus, if: 
-    
   ∊[0;0.2], then, holding all other input parameters unchanged, changes in parameter 
I are not critical to the output, R; 
-    
   ∊ (0.2;0.5], then changes in parameter I are moderately critical to the output, R; 
-    
   ∊ (0.5;1], then changes in parameter I are critical to the output, R; 
-    
   ∊ (1; +∞), then changes in parameter I are very critical to the output, R. 
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Table G.3: Sensitivity Analysis of the Base Case results 
Country 
Base 
case 
 [1] 
Sensitivity Scenarios 
N1 
[2] 
N2 
[3] 
N3 
[4] 
N4 
[5] 
N5 
[6] 
N6 
[7] 
N7 
[8] 
N8 
[9] 
N9 
[10] 
N10 
[11] 
FINAL PRICES (US$/tcm)a 
Austria 700 581 998 697 806 735 690 697 703 606 798 
Belgium and Luxembourg 532 553 614 525 602 593 505 391 671 500 517 
Bulgaria 885 659 1368 883 992 908 883 883 887 887 884 
Balkans 816 625 1256 814 923 839 814 814 818 818 864 
Baltic States 775 580 1208 773 888 796 774 775 776 776 775 
Czech Republic 654 572 913 651 751 694 641 629 686 652 683 
Germany 605 566 794 600 699 654 587 570 655 598 644 
Finland 897 661 1400 894 1010 918 896 897 898 898 896 
France 425 486 502 420 523 481 405 366 582 422 440 
Greece 453 476 573 450 541 505 436 399 630 442 467 
Croatia 611 484 928 608 719 633 609 609 612 605 610 
Hungary 814 630 1242 811 921 838 811 812 815 815 812 
Spain and Portugal 450 497 563 447 518 504 432 404 580 427 470 
Italy and Switzerland 420 471 503 417 505 472 403 379 512 410 450 
Netherlands 608 596 755 600 678 665 583 501 717 574 683 
Poland 508 499 688 506 609 560 489 452 541 480 524 
Romania 290 268 366 287 400 323 282 289 291 291 289 
Slovakia 871 662 1346 869 979 893 869 870 873 873 870 
Slovenia 715 612 1085 713 797 742 712 727 714 716 801 
Turkey 539 456 742 537 647 576 530 430 604 537 539 
UK 389 456 432 373 472 448 365 317 518 358 403 
Gazprom Profit, US$ bn 117.7 141.5 131.1 124.6 108.0 138.4 111.9 106.7 140.3 120.9 118.4 
Statoil Profit, US$ bn 49.9 53.7 60.3 50.7 51.9 56.6 47.3 43.7 62.3 47.4 53.2 
Producer Profit: Rest of World, US$ bn 125.7 144.3 146.4 125.2 160.8 149.1 119.1 119.0 132.7 121.5 136.4 
Transit Profit, US$ bn 1.0 2.3 0.6 1.1 0.5 1.3 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.4 0.9 
Consumer Surplus, US$ bn 386.9 257.4 579.1 391.4 330.1 382.5 383.6 427.8 327.3 398.5 370.5 
Social Welfare, US$ bn 681.3 602.3 917.4 688.9 651.2 727.8 662.8 698.1 663.9 689.7 679.3 
Consumption: Western and Southern Europe, bcm/y 564 645 489 568 525 583 552 592 516 573 550 
Consumption: Eastern Europe and Balkans, bcm/y 112 134 96 112 96 116 109 119 107 113 111 
a reported values are averages (2010-2030) 
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The robustness criteria (G.1) are presented in Table G.4. Table G.4 is the “traffic light” of the 
sensitivity of the Base Case results to changes in important assumptions. As can be seen, across 
our ten sensitivity scenarios only two input parameters have the most critical impacts on model 
results – the elasticity of demand and the production capacities of the two largest producers in the 
model (Russia and Norway) (“red and yellow” highlights in Table G.4). A decrease in production 
capacities (scenario N4) is more critical to the model results than an increase in production 
capacities (scenario N3). In general, a one percentage point (p.p.) decrease in the production 
forecast of Russia and Norway relative to the Base Case forecast changes the final prices by more 
than 0.5 p.p. for most of the countries in this model (with a few countries seeing changes in prices 
of more than 1 p.p.). Changes in other inputs have very little effect on the model’s results – a 1 p.p. 
change in all other input parameters only changes the model results by 0-0.2 p.p. (“green” 
highlight throughout Table D.4). In general, the model results are fairly robust to changes in major 
structural input parameters. 
Table G.4: Results of Sensitivity Scenarios - Changes Relative to the Base Case Results 
Country 
Sensitivity Scenarios 
N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 
 FINAL PRICES 
Austria -0.17 0.43 -0.02 0.76 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.13 0.14 
Belgium and Luxembourg 0.04 0.15 -0.07 0.66 0.11 -0.05 -0.26 0.26 -0.06 -0.03 
Bulgaria -0.26 0.55 -0.01 0.60 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Balkans -0.23 0.54 -0.02 0.65 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 
Baltic States -0.25 0.56 -0.02 0.73 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Czech Republic -0.13 0.40 -0.03 0.74 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.04 
Germany -0.06 0.31 -0.04 0.78 0.08 -0.03 -0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.06 
Finland -0.26 0.56 -0.01 0.63 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
France 0.14 0.18 -0.06 1.15 0.13 -0.05 -0.14 0.37 -0.01 0.04 
Greece 0.05 0.27 -0.04 0.97 0.12 -0.04 -0.12 0.39 -0.02 0.03 
Croatia -0.21 0.52 -0.02 0.89 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Hungary -0.23 0.53 -0.02 0.66 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Spain and Portugal 0.11 0.25 -0.03 0.76 0.12 -0.04 -0.10 0.29 -0.05 0.04 
Italy and Switzerland 0.12 0.20 -0.04 1.01 0.12 -0.04 -0.10 0.22 -0.02 0.07 
Netherlands -0.02 0.24 -0.06 0.58 0.09 -0.04 -0.18 0.18 -0.06 0.12 
Poland -0.02 0.35 -0.01 1.00 0.10 -0.04 -0.11 0.07 -0.06 0.03 
Romania -0.08 0.26 -0.04 1.90 0.11 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Slovakia -0.24 0.55 -0.01 0.62 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Slovenia -0.14 0.52 -0.01 0.57 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.12 
Turkey -0.16 0.37 -0.02 1.00 0.07 -0.02 -0.20 0.12 -0.01 0.00 
UK 0.17 0.11 -0.22 1.06 0.15 -0.06 -0.19 0.33 -0.08 0.03 
Producer Profit: Rest of World 0.15 0.17 -0.02 1.39 0.19 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.09 
Gazprom Profit 0.20 0.11 0.30 -0.41 0.18 -0.05 -0.09 0.19 0.03 0.01 
Statoil Profit 0.07 0.21 0.08 0.20 0.13 -0.05 -0.12 0.25 -0.05 0.07 
Transit Profit 1.16 -0.46 0.05 -2.39 0.21 -0.15 -0.21 0.30 0.31 -0.17 
Consumer Surplus -0.33 0.50 0.06 -0.74 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.15 0.03 -0.04 
Social Welfare -0.12 0.35 0.06 -0.22 0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.00 
Consumption: Western Europe 0.14 -0.13 0.03 -0.35 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 
Consumption: Eastern Europe 0.19 -0.14 0.02 -0.72 0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 
 
Legend:    
   ∊[     ]    
  ∊(0.2;0.5]    
  ∊(0.5;1]    
  ∊    ∞  
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3. Sensitivity analysis: conjectured transit demand slope 
The following sensitivity scenarios (Box G.2) were run to check the robustness of the results 
against different assumptions about the conjectured transit demand slope, M.  
 
Scenarios Description 
A This scenario is described in Section 4.2.2. The following conjectured transit 
parameters are assumed: 
              
                                                                                                                                            
where       
  
’ is the capacity of the transit pipeline (u,u’) (for details of transit 
pipeline capacities see Table C.3) 
B In this scenario, the following conjecture parameters are assumed: 
              
                                                                                                                  
C The conjecture parameters for this scenario are as follows: 
              
                              0                                                                                   
D For this scenario, the conjecture transit parameters are as follows: 
              
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
E In this scenario, it is assumed that transit countries have extremely limited 
bargaining power vis-a-vis Gazprom: 
              
                              00                                                                                                                                                                                           
This situation is possible when Gazprom has alternative routes that have a 
capacity equal to the capacities of transit pipelines (e.g., when Gazprom 
completes the construction of Nord Stream and South Stream, which will allow it 
to totally bypass Ukraine as a major transit corridor) 
Box G.2: Scenarios of the Market Power of Transit Countries 
 
As can be seen from Table G.5 below, the important conclusion is that different assumptions 
about the transit conjecture parameter only substantially affect the profits of transit countries. In 
general, different transit conjecture parameters only slightly modify the model results - within a 
range of 1% from the Base Case results. 
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Table G.5: Sensitivity Analysis: Market Power of Transit Countries 
 
Country 
Base 
case 
 [1] 
Sensitivity Scenarios 
A 
[2] 
B 
[3] 
C 
[4] 
D 
[5] 
E 
[6] 
Change (%) 
[2]/[1]  [3]/[1] [4]/[1] [5]/[1] [6]/[1] 
FINAL PRICES (US$/tcm)a 
Austria 700 700 692 692 692 692 100.0% 98.8% 98.8% 98.8% 98.8% 
Belgium and Luxembourg 532 532 530 530 530 529 99.9% 99.5% 99.5% 99.5% 99.5% 
Bulgaria 886 888 879 878 878 878 100.1% 99.1% 99.1% 99.1% 99.1% 
Balkans 817 818 808 808 808 808 100.1% 99.0% 99.0% 98.9% 98.9% 
Baltic States 776 775 775 775 775 775 99.9% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Czech Republic 655 654 648 648 648 648 99.8% 99.0% 98.9% 98.9% 98.9% 
Germany 605 604 599 599 599 599 99.9% 99.0% 99.0% 99.0% 99.0% 
Finland 897 897 897 897 897 897 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
France 425 424 420 420 420 420 99.9% 98.9% 98.9% 98.8% 98.8% 
Greece 454 453 450 449 449 449 99.9% 99.1% 99.1% 99.1% 99.1% 
Croatia 611 613 603 602 602 602 100.2% 98.6% 98.5% 98.5% 98.5% 
Hungary 814 816 806 805 805 805 100.2% 98.9% 98.9% 98.9% 98.9% 
Spain and Portugal 450 450 447 447 447 447 99.9% 99.4% 99.3% 99.3% 99.3% 
Italy and Switzerland 421 421 416 416 416 416 100.0% 98.9% 98.9% 98.8% 98.8% 
Netherlands 608 608 605 605 605 605 100.0% 99.5% 99.5% 99.5% 99.5% 
Poland 508 538 505 504 504 504 105.8% 99.3% 99.2% 99.2% 99.2% 
Romania 291 292 282 282 282 282 100.5% 97.1% 96.9% 96.9% 96.8% 
Slovakia 872 870 863 863 863 863 99.8% 99.0% 99.0% 98.9% 98.9% 
Slovenia 715 715 709 709 709 709 100.0% 99.2% 99.2% 99.2% 99.1% 
Turkey 540 541 540 540 540 540 100.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
UK 390 389 387 387 387 387 99.9% 99.5% 99.4% 99.4% 99.4% 
Gazprom Profit, US$ bln 117.7 119.2 121.6 121.7 121.8 121.8 101.3% 103.4% 103.5% 103.5% 103.5% 
Producer Profit: Rest of World, US$ bln 175.6 177.8 175.7 175.6 175.6 175.6 101.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Transit Profit, US$ bln 1.0 2.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 212.3% 17.8% 9.3% 6.4% 4.9% 
Consumer Surplus, US$ bln 386.9 386.4 389.5 389.5 389.5 389.6 99.9% 100.7% 100.7% 100.7% 100.7% 
Social Welfare, US$ bln 681.3 685.6 687.0 687.0 687.0 687.0 100.6% 100.8% 100.8% 100.8% 100.8% 
Consumption: Western and Southern Europe, bcm/y 564 564 566 566 566 566 100.0% 100.3% 100.3% 100.3% 100.3% 
Consumption: Eastern Europe and Balkans, bcm/y 112 111 113 113 113 113 99.2% 100.6% 100.6% 100.6% 100.6% 
Transit through Ukraine, bcm/y 60 55 63 63 63 63 92.0% 106.2% 106.3% 106.4% 106.4% 
Transit through Belarus, bcm/y 29 13 30 30 30 30 43.6% 102.7% 102.7% 102.7% 102.7% 
Transit fee through Ukraine, US$/tcm 17.45 34.59 5.83 5.09 4.83 4.69 198.2% 33.4% 29.2% 27.7% 26.9% 
Transit fee through Belarus, US$/tcm 10.37 55.62 5.81 4.27 3.75 3.49 536.6% 56.1% 41.2% 36.2% 33.7% 
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Appendix H. Russia’s Current Gas Export Routes to Europe 
 
As of 2008, Russia’s overall gas export capacity through pipelines to Europe, including 
Turkey, is around 214 billion cubic metres (bcm) (see Table H.1). There are two main routes 
which Gazprom currently uses to export gas to Europe: through Ukraine and Belarus.  
 
Table H.1: Gazprom’s Existing Export Options 
Transit 
Final Markets Design 
Capacity, 
bcm/y 
Actual volume 
transported in 
2008, bcm/y 
Through Ukraine 
To Western and Eastern Europe 92.6 75.5 
To Poland 5.0 4.8 
To Hungary, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 13.2 12.1 
To Romania 4.5 2.0 
To Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and Turkey 26.8 22.5 
Through Belarus48 
To Poland and Germany 36.3 35.2 
To Lithuania 6.4 2.8 
Direct Sales 
To Finland 8.1 4.8 
To Latvia and Estonia 5.4 1.3 
To Turkey via Blue Stream 16.0 9.3 
Total 214.3 170.3 
Share of Ukraine in Transportation of Russian Gas Exports, % 66.3 68.6 
Share of Belarus in Transportation of Russian Gas Exports, % 19.9 22.3 
Sources: Own calculations based on (ENTSOG, 2010; Naftogaz of Ukraine, 2010; Gazprom, 2010a; Yafimava, 2009; 
Chyong, forthcoming) 
 
Direct gas sales to final markets constitute some 9% of total exports to Europe 
(including Turkey). The rest of Gazprom’s exports are transported through Ukraine and 
Belarus. Before 2003, nearly 95% of all Russian gas exports went through Ukraine.49 Due to 
past conflicts between Russia and Ukraine over the terms of the gas trade, including transit 
fees, import prices and debt clearance by Ukraine, Russia has initiated several pipeline 
projects to bypass Ukraine. One of these projects is the Yamal-Europe I gas pipeline which 
traverses Belarus and Poland. The total throughput of Yamal I is 30.6 bcm/year (ENTSOG, 
2010). Yamal-Europe I serves as the basis of Russia’s northern gas export corridor to Europe. 
                                                        
48 We only report export capacity through Belarus to Poland and Germany; export capacity through Northern 
Light which re-enters Ukraine has been omitted in this table for simplicity. 
49 Authors’ own calculations based on Gazprom (2010a), Naftogaz of Ukraine (2010), Yafimava (2009). 
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The delivery point through Yamal-I is at Mallnow on the Germany-Poland border (near 
Frankfurt-am-Oder).  
The majority of Russian gas exports to Europe still traverse the southern gas export corridor, 
via Ukrainian territory. In 2008, around 68% (see table A1) of all Russian gas exports to 
Europe were transported through Ukraine. The delivery points of Russian gas through 
Ukraine are: (i) the Ukrainian-Slovak border, (ii) Baumgarten Gas Hub (Austria), and (iii) the 
Czech-German border (Waidhaus and Olbernhau).  
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Appendix I. Sensitivity Analysis of Downstream Competition 
 
In order to assess the effects of downstream competition on Nord Stream investment 
and its impact on market efficiency, some sensitivity analyses have been conducted. The 
following downstream market competition scenarios are analysed (Table I.1): 
 
Table I.1: Downstream market competition scenarios 
 Low Competition 
Case 
Base 
Case 
High Competition 
Case 
Number of traders 
per country 
1 4 8 
 
The results presented in Section 5.2 are based on the Base Case downstream market 
competition scenario; the impact of alternative assumptions (i.e., low and high downstream 
competition cases) on profits of market participants and on social welfare is reported in Table 
I.2. As can be seen from Table I.2, changes in profits of market participants and social welfare 
due to investment in the Nord Stream project vary among downstream competition cases. 
However, the basic conclusion that the higher competition between market participants, the 
higher is the benefit of Nord Stream investment to social welfare is robust to the level of 
downstream competition. 
 
Table I.2: Annualized Net Gains (Losses) Resulting from Investment in Nord Stream under 
different downstream competition scenarios (US$ bn/year) 
  Successive market power Double Marginalization 
  
Low 
Competition 
Case 
Base 
Case 
High 
Competition 
Case 
Low 
Competition 
Case 
Base 
Case 
High 
Competition 
Case 
Gazprom’s Profit -1.5 2.7 4.2 -1.9 0.3 1.1 
Profit of transit 
countries -0.2 -2.1 -3.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.7 
Profit of all other 
producers -1.4 -6.5 -7.2 -1.1 -4.1 -4.5 
Profit of all Traders 0.9 2.5 1.6 0.6 2.3 2.3 
Consumer Surplus 0.5 3.4 4.8 0.4 2.7 4.1 
Social Welfare -1.7 0.01 0.4 -2.0 0.7 2.2 
As can be seen from Table I.2, the negative impact of Nord Stream investment on social 
welfare under the low competition case (successive market power and double 
marginalization scenarios) is majorly driven by losses incurred by Gazprom, other producers 
and transit countries. Under the low competition case Nord Stream investment affects 
Gazprom’s profit negatively (Table I.2: US$ -1.5 bn/y for the successive market power 
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scenario and US$ -1.9 bn/y for the double marginalization scenario) because of extremely low 
demand for gas in Europe (Table I.3). Therefore, due to low demand, the Nord Stream pipeline 
is not fully utilized (see Table I.4) and Gazprom has to pay cost for unused capacity of the 
Nord Stream system.50 This cost outweighs Gazprom’s additional revenue from extra market 
share (Table I.3) and therefore investment in the Nord Stream pipeline has a negative value 
for Gazprom in the low competition cases. Negative impact of Nord Stream investment on 
profits of other producers is mainly due to the loss of their market share (slightly, see Table 
I.3) to Gazprom once the pipeline is built. Also, when Nord Stream is built, Gazprom re-directs 
some of transit flows through Ukraine and Belarus to the new route and thus negatively 
impacts profits of transit countries (Table I.2: Successive market power scenario and low 
competition case). 
 
Table I.3: Average Annual Consumption and Prices in Europe under different competition 
scenarios: 2010-2030 
    Successive market power Double Marginalization 
    
Low 
Competition 
Case 
Base 
Case 
High 
Competition 
Case 
Low 
Competition 
Case 
Base 
Case 
High 
Competition 
Case 
Russian gas export 
to Europe (bcm) 
NS is built 64 134 155 65 141 163 
NS is not built 61 126 147 63 133 156 
Consumption in 
Europe (bcm) 
NS is built 381 569 615 381 575 622 
NS is not built 380 567 612 381 572 619 
Gazprom’s market 
share in Europe 
NS is built 17% 24% 25% 17% 24% 26% 
NS is not built 16% 22% 24% 16% 23% 25% 
Averagea border 
prices (US$/tcm) 
NS is built 339 416 450 338 414 446 
NS is not built 341 427 462 339 420 454 
Averagea final 
prices (US$/tcm) 
NS is built 994 674 597 995 680 605 
NS is not built 993 669 589 994 673 596 
Note: a quantity-weighted; NS – Nord Stream 
 
Table I.4: Transportation through the Nord Stream system (bcm) 
  Successive market power Double Marginalization 
  
Nord 
Stream's 
Capacity 
Low 
Competition 
Case 
Base 
Case 
High 
Competition 
Case 
Low 
Competition 
Case 
Base 
Case 
High 
Competition 
Case 
2011 7 3 7 7 0 7 7 
2015 55 5 41 52 0 32 45 
2020 55 8 48 55 0 40 51 
2025 55 6 51 55 6 44 55 
2030 55 21 55 55 16 53 55 
Average Utilization 
rate (2011-2030) 17% 88% 99% 7% 76% 94% 
 
                                                        
50 Cost of unused transport capacity of the Nord Stream system is calculated as the product of unit transport cost 
through the system (as reported in Appendix C: Table C.9) and the difference between Nord Stream’s capacity 
and its actual usage (see Table I.4). 
